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INTRODUCTION
As U.S. corporations face intensifying global competition,
American labor relations are undergoing a historic transformation.'
Increasingly, many U.S. managers are seeking a competitive edge by
changing their traditionally adversarial relationship with labor. In-
stead, firms are attempting to reshape their corporate cultures to
foster the high-trust work relations necessary to support changing
methods of work organization. Firms are responding to interna-
tional market demands by moving away from hierarchical produc-
tion processes that involve narrow job assignments and close
supervision. Firms have implemented participatory work programs
that encourage workers to engage in problem-solving and dialogue
concerning production inefficiencies. Industrial relations experts
maintain that these innovative shopfloor practices usually improve
employee attitudes in the short-run and thus lead to temporary in-
creases in productivity. Preserving a cooperative workplace atmos-
phere, however, has proven to be a more difficult task.2
At the same time that firms struggle to promote worker com-
mitment and morale on the shopfloor, market pressures frequently
require directors to revise strategies involving production processes
and plant locations in ways that adversely impact the employees'
welfare by threatening job security. Because workers have no right
to influence these decisions through the traditional collective bar-
gaining process, they have no guarantee that directors will weigh
their concerns when formulating strategic corporate policies. Thus,
the existing paradigm of the employees' role in the corporate struc-
ture reveals an internal contradiction: cooperative innovations on
the shopfloor have not been supplemented by corresponding poli-
cies at the higher levels of corporate planning involving collective
bargaining and board decisionmaking.
This inconsistency raises the issue whether the traditional sys-
tem of corporate governance can accommodate the challenges of
international competition. Most of the corporate scholars address-
ing this question concentrate upon reforming the federal securities
laws to remove legal impediments that prevent institutional share-
holders from exercising their power.3 This seems to be a step in the
1 For further discussion of how firms are changing production processes to meet
changing market demands, see PETER B. DOERINGER, TURBULENCE IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1991); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); MICHAELJ. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUS-
TRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984); ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT
AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983).
2 KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 110.
3 For a discussion of the role of institutional shareholders, see ROBERT MONKS &
NELL MINOW, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
1993]
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right direction. Yet, this focus upon financial capital is too narrow
because it ignores one of the most significant factors of competitive-
ness in global markets-the role of human capital. Corporate schol-
ars must join labor scholars in rethinking traditional solutions to
corporate governance in order to accommodate the changing role
of employees in the corporate structure. Many European countries
have a long history of recognizing the employees' voice in corporate
governance. The time has come to reshape conventional corporate
law discourse in the United States to encompass employees as mem-
bers of the firm.
In this Article, I focus on expanding the existing fiduciary du-
ties of directors to encompass obligations to employees. This raises
profound political questions about reforming corporate law to regu-
late the employment relationship. Entering this debate requires
choices about the types of analytical tools that will promote dialogue
concerning the fiduciary duties of directors. When Professors Berle
and Dodd examined this topic over fifty years ago,4 the law and eco-
nomics movement did not exist. Although efficiency analysis cannot
provide definitive answers, economic models can enlighten policy
discussion when used with a normative vision about the kinds of re-
lationships the law should encourage. This Article maintains that
legal reform requiring labor participation in corporate governance
is necessary not only to achieve social goals concerning industrial
democracy but also to promote efficient corporate behavior in a
changing world economy.5
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990);John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Con-
ard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988). Corpo-
rate scholars are beginning to look at corporate governance as a means to foster efficient
production. Ronald Gilson & Mark Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Be-
tween Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L. J. 871 (1993).
4 For the exchange between Professors Berle and Dodd, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciay Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L.
REv. 194 (1935); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
5 Academics and practitioners should strive to use new perspectives to reconceptu-
alize the corporation that protects the noncontractual expectations of employees. These
perspectives include critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race the-
ory. In my view, given the current economic climate, questions of efficiency must be
considered in discussing the employees' role in the firm. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Work-
place Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1,
7 (1988) ("Efficiency is simply too important a matter to be left to management.") [here-
inafter Klare, Agenda]; see also Karl E. Klare, The Labor Management Cooperation Debate: A
Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 39 (1988) (arguing that con-
cerns about equity and self-realization cannot eliminate attention to efficiency) [herein-
after Klare, Debate].
The stakeholder debate has prompted corporate scholars to search for different
perspectives from which to analyze corporate law. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
902 [Vol. 78:899
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As a first step, Part I seeks to reinforce this position at what has
been its weakest point-vulnerability to prevailing economic theo-
ries. Part I uses the transaction cost model of the firm to examine
innovative shopfloor practices. This analysis reveals that par-
ticipatory work programs require workers to invest in firm-specific
skills in an environment of increasing employment insecurity.
Given these additional transactional hazards, the transaction cost
model demonstrates that the traditional collective bargaining solu-
tion is insufficient both for raising worker morale to increase pro-
ductivity and for influencing strategic decisions that impact
employee interests. This part concludes that this model is limited in
its ability to explain the most important aspects of new work organi-
zation methods. The theory presents the firm as a hierarchical
structure designed to prevent shirking. This perspective is too nar-
row because it fails to address the problem of creating corporate
cultures that foster creative and productive behavior.
Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multiplayer Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990) (using
game theory to analyze stakeholder issues); Lymon Johnson, Individual and Collective Sov-
ereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (urging corporate schol-
ars to broaden their views by incorporating sociology). Other corporate scholars have
encompassed critical legal studies perspectives in corporate scholarship. See, e.g.,
Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69
N.C. L. REV. 273, 317-18 (1991) (discussing the need to incorporate critical legal studies
and feminist scholarship into the nexus of contracts model of the firm); LymanJohnson,
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV.
865, 884 (1990) (asserting that "[w]hile corporate law generally has escaped the critical
legal studies movement, the takeover debate [may] take on the polarizing overtones of
pitting the privileged against the unprivileged."); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 251 ("Critical scholars ... have not done nearly enough to apply
their theoretical insights to important practical problems."). For the most part, critical
legal studies scholars have not used their tools of deconstruction in the corporate law
area. For a critical legal studies perspective of corporate law, see Gerald E. Frug, The
Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1984) (concentrating on
the shareholders' relationship with the corporation); William Simon, Contract Versus Poli-
tics in Corporate Doctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 387 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (discussing
the employees's and the local community's role in the firm); Charles Watts, A Race in
the Corporate Bastion-A Case in Point (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(using critical race theory to argue for reforms to diversify upper-level management).
Although feminist scholars have not written widely about corporate law, relational femi-
nism that emphasizes connection and community rather than the narrow pursuit of self-
interest offers an important insight into new corporate cultures. For an overview of this
work, see CAROL GiLLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1988); Robin West,Jurisprdence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
Adolf Berle's references to Catholic social thought also provide a refreshingly dif-
ferent analysis of the employees' role in the corporate structure. Berle uses religious
metaphors to reconceptualize the manager's role as a disinterested public servant. See,
e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE TwENTIEm CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1955); see
also Thomas Kohler, Lessons From the Social Charter: State Corporate Law and the Meaning of
Subsidiary, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. (forthcoming 1993) (describing how Catholic social
thought influences the Social Charter in Europe).
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Part II uses game-theory models and industrial relations theo-
ries to examine the tensions and conflicts that arise from maintain-
ing employee commitment to participatory work programs. This
part recognizes that the traditional system of corporate governance
provides inadequate protection against the expropriation of firm-
specific human capital investments and emphasizes that this makes
employees reluctant to accept innovations and disclose information
that may decrease employment stability. This part then argues that
this lack of protection may jeopardize the long-term success of the
new shopfloor practices because workers may respond by reducing
effort norms and withdrawing cooperation from the workplace.
Part III builds upon this foundation to consider the implica-
tions that the emerging form of labor relations has for issues con-
cerning corporate governance. This part maintains that worker
representation on corporate boards is necessary to protect employ-
ees' firm-specific investments and to facilitate an atmosphere condu-
cive to a high level of employee trust in volatile economic
conditions. This part also asserts that legal intervention is required
to implement these changes because the traditional regime of share-
holder supremacy and adversarial labor relations discourage indi-
vidual firms from voluntarily undertaking these internally efficient
reorganizations.
Part IV seeks to translate these economic paradigms into a new
model of corporate governance entitled the "neutral referee
model." Under this proposal, directors would serve as neutral
referees to balance the competing interests of shareholders and em-
ployees. Directors would owe fiduciary obligations to employees,
including the duty to provide information and consult with them
about strategic decisions that affect job security and working condi-
tions. In order to facilitate employee efforts to exercise these pro-
posed rights, this part also includes a proposal for Employee
Participation Committees modeled upon the German system of
works councils. This Article concludes that the neutral referee
model would significantly promote efforts to foster labor-manage-
ment cooperation and meet the demands of international
competition.
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I
THE EMPLOYEES' ROLE IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE:
PARADIGMS IN TRANSITION
A. The Transaction Cost Model of the Firm and the
Employment Relationship
1. Work Organization and Corporate Governance
The prevailing economic paradigm of the firm, the "nexus of
contracts" theory, views the firm as a bundle of implicit and explicit
contractual relationships among shareholders, managers, employ-
ees, suppliers, the local community, and others. 6 Oliver Williamson
has significantly contributed to this theory by incorporating two as-
sumptions about human behavior. The first assumption, known as
"bounded rationality," emphasizes that parties entering into com-
plex, long-term business relationships cannot foresee every possible
contingency. 7 The second assumption, known as "opportunism,"
focuses on the possibility that one party may attempt to appropriate
gains from the transaction at the other's expense. Vulnerability to
opportunism increases when parties make transaction-specific in-
vestments, because they cannot exit from the contract without
forfeiting these investments. Given these transactual barriers, ex-
plicit contractual safeguards are often inadequate to govern the par-
ties' relationship; the initial risk distribution process usually
requires adjustments to accommodate subsequent events. Thus, the
parties leave terms open and attempt to signal their willingness to
cooperate in the future by consenting to structures and procedures
that will govern their ongoing transactions. 8 In designing these
processes, the parties seek to realign their incentives so that the
promise to act fairly in the future is self-enforcing. Devising such
processes, however, becomes more difficult as the number of trans-
action-specific investments and the amount of uncertainty increase.9
6 This theory builds upon Ronald Coase's seminal theory of firms as cost-efficient
alternatives to market transactions. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONoMICA 386 (1937). For a critical evaluation of this theory's influence on corporate
law, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
7 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS 21-26 (1975) (discussing bounded rationality and
uncertainty/complexity).
8 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
163-205 (1985) (discussing how parties attempt to foster trust by giving credible com-
mitments) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 83 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1983) (same)
[hereinafter Williamson, Credible Commitments].
9 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 52-56.
1993] 905
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Williamson uses this transaction cost approach to explain how
production is organized within the firm.' 0 He asserts that managers
and workers agree to delegate power to management over certain
issues referred to as the "zones of acceptance."" This delegation
occurs because hierarchical production processes have four effi-
ciency advantages over "peer group" shopfloor practices that in-
volve a higher degree of team effort and worker consultation. First,
Williamson suggests that centralized planning under the hierarchi-
cal approach reduces the expense involved in organizing day-to-day
operations in comparison to peer group methods that seek em-
ployee suggestions about changes in production processes.' 2 Sec-
ond, by avoiding the need for employee consent under the peer
group method, Williamson asserts that the hierarchical approach
provides more flexibility and less uncertainty when it is necessary to
adapt production processes to changing market conditions.13
Third, Williamson maintains that the hierarchical structure achieves
greater efficiency by permitting managers to specialize as monitors
to prevent shirking. In contrast, the peer group system creates
greater incentives for each team member to shirk because the indi-
vidual member's input has only a small impact on output.1 4 Fourth,
Williamson maintains that the "command and control" arrange-
ment under the hierarchical system reduces many of the opportuni-
ties for strategic bargaining between managers and employees
provided under the peer group method.' 5 Therefore, Williamson
argues, the dominance of hierarchical shopfloor methods over more
participatory models can be explained in terms of lower transaction
costs.
Transaction cost economics sheds further light on the nature of
the firm by exploring an issue related to work organization-the
structure of corporate governance. 16 Under Williamson's model,
the firm internalizes transactions characterized by high asset speci-
ficity and uncertainty through corporate governance systems.
10 Id. at 155-75.
11 Id. at 249 (Hierarchical arrangement provides that management orders concern-
ing these dimensions of production will be implemented without resistance.); see also
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (Firm hierarchy arises
from delegations of power by firm participants acting to reduce transaction costs.).
12 WILLAMSON, supra note 7, at 45-47.
13 Id. at 47.
14 Id. at 53-54. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz first highlighted the measure-
ment problems that arise when teams of workers cooperate to produce goods. Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
15 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 71.
16 Id. at 29, 211 (discussing how measurement problem that occurs in designing
work organization is related to issues concerning corporate governance).
906 [Vol. 78:899
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Board representation protects firm-specific investments by provid-
ing an opportunity to monitor and participate in management of the
firm. Williamson asserts that the nature of shareholders' invest-
ments requires this type of safeguard because other contractual pro-
tections are inadequate. 17 In contrast, Williamson assumes that the
employee's investments involve lower asset-specificity and uncer-
tainty, and collective bargaining agreements are sufficient to safe-
guard their concerns.' 8 Williamson recognizes that bounded
rationality and opportunism prevent managers and employees from
fully protecting their interests through collective bargaining.
Therefore, Williamson suggests that the parties develop additional
procedural safeguards referred to as "internal labor markets."'19 In
general, internal labor markets involve human resource policies
concerning job security, training, and job design that impact how
production is organized on the shopfloor.20
2. Internal Labor Markets, Firm-Specific Investments, and
Opportunism
Questions regarding the employees' role in the corporate struc-
ture are not appropriate if the employment relationship merely
consists of workers exchanging a certain amount of labor for specific
market-determined wages. But this is not the case. One-fourth of
the total workforce and over half of the male workforce remain at
the same firm for at least twenty years. 21 Labor economists theorize
17 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
18 Id. at 1207-09 (collective bargaining may substitute for labor representation on
the board). Katherine Stone criticized Williamson for failing to recognize how the priva-
tized system of collective bargaining that has arisen under the National Labor Relations
Act fails to protect labor from the adverse corporate decisions. Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73, 158 (1988). Williamson does, however, leave open the possibility of
labor representation on the corporate board for informational purposes when the aca-
demic environment is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. Williamson, supra
note 17, at 1209.
Williamson assumes that workers with general purpose skills do not need specific
protection because they can easily find employment elsewhere. Id. at 1207 ("Such work-
ers can quit and be replaced without productive loss to either the workers or the firm.").
Williamson nonetheless recognizes to some extent the harsh consequences faced by dis-
placed workers. Id. at 1207 n.31. ("We may want to create some barriers to deter termi-
nation without cause and reduce transition costs.")
19 Oliver E. Williamson,. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Re-
lations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 257 (1979). Williamson suggests that unionization facili-
tates the development of internal labor markets, but that it is not necessary for these
markets to operate successfully. WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 75-76.
20 See PAUL OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION, DISLOCATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 60-67 (1988).
21 Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 716, 724 (1982); see also John T. Addison & Albert C. Castro, The Importance of
Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
1993] 907
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that large corporations develop internal labor markets that en-
courage employees to develop long-term attachments to their
firms.2 2 In general, the parties understand that in exchange for an
employee's lifetime contribution, the firm will provide a degree of
job security. This arrangement involves an "invisible handshake. '23
Although the agreement is not legally enforceable, the parties act
"as if" a contract exists.
Firms and workers internalize the employment relationship be-
cause external market relationships are inadequate for two reasons.
First, external labor markets are not conducive to making invest-
ments in human capital. Firms are reluctant to provide training un-
less they have some assurance that employees will stay with the firm
long enough to recoup the returns from the investments. Internal
labor markets facilitate firm investments in training by requiring em-
ployees to bear part of the expense of acquiring human capital in
their junior years. 24 That is, firms pay workers wage rates less than
their marginal product in their early years and more than their mar-
ginal product in their later years. By deferring compensation, inter-
nal labor markets provide an incentive for employees to remain with
the firm.25
Second, under external market arrangements, firms incur high
monitoring costs to reduce shirking because employees tend to per-
form only according to minimally acceptable standards concerning
the quality and quantity of work effort.26 Using Williamson's terms,
external market arrangements produce "perfunctory cooperation"
393, 402 (1987) (noting that union workers enjoy a slightly higher tenure, which may be
attributable to an informational advantage).
22 Labor economists first use the implicit employment theory to explain the wage
rigidity in contemporary labor markets. Three early contributors to the implicit employ-
ment contract literature are Costas Azariadis, Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equi-
libria, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1183 (1975); Martin Baily, Wages and Employment Under Uncertain
Demand, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 37 (1974); Donald F. Gordon, A Neoclassical Theory of Keyne-
sian Unemployment, 12 ECoN. INQUIRY 431 (1974). For an overview of internal labor mar-
kets, see, e.g., PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAELJ. PIORE, INTERNATIONAL LABOR MARKETS
AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1985); RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT SMrrH, MOD-
ERN LABOR ECONOMICS 421-27 (3d ed. 1988).
23 See Arthur M. Okun, The Invisible Handshake and the Inflationay Process, 22 GHAL-
LENGE 5 (1980).
24 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 62-63. Employees are reluctant to bear the expense
of acquiring firm-specific human capital because these investments may lose value when
the employees lose theirjobs. Firm-specific investments in human capital pose the dan-
ger that once employees receive firm-specific training, they will "hoard information to
their personal advantage." Id. at 63. This contracting problem, referred to as "informa-
tional asymmetry," intensifies as the degree of asset specificity increases. Id. at 63-64.
25 Id.
26 Whereas firms tend to be risk-neutral, workers are relatively risk-averse because
they face harsh consequences from unemployment if their firm suffers a temporary fluc-
tuation in demand for their labor. Through implicit contracts, firms smooth the work-
ers' income flows through wage rigidity and long-term employment. See Costas
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but not "consummate cooperation." 27 In other words, these ar-
rangements induce compliance with work rules but do not lend to
additional effort or initiative. Williamson explains that extensive
monitoring produces a negative workplace atmosphere, with lower
productivity resulting from the "influence of metering intensity on
work attitudes. ' 28 In contrast, internal labor markets attempt to
mitigate these problems by establishing "job ladders." Employees
begin their careers at the bottom of these ladders, referred to as
"ports of entry," and climb to higher levels that are not usually open
to employees in the general labor market.29 This system ofjob lad-
ders encourages consummate cooperation by rewarding dedicated,
long-term employees with seniority benefits in the form of promo-
tions, higher wages, and job security.30
Because implicit employment arrangements are not legally
binding contracts, both parties must rely on extra-legal enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that the agreements are fulfilled. Firms deter
opportunistic conduct by requiring employees to post bonds in the
form of uncompensated labor during the early years of service.
These bonds constitute "job market tolls" that the employees must
pay in order to enter a job ladder.31 These tolls reduce opportu-
nism because employees must surrender these bonds when they quit
or are dismissed for poor performance.3 2 In this way, these job
market tolls tend to lock in the employees' investments in the firm
to ensure that they will perform adequately in the future.
Unfortunately, these extra-legal enforcement mechanisms may
not prevent firms from reneging on their obligations under implicit
labor arrangements. Firms have an incentive to abandon these
agreements and expropriate the workers' share of the firm surplus
represented by the deferred compensation and wages that exceed
Azariadis &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria, 98 QJ. ECoN. 1
(1983).
27 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 69.
28 Id. at 25. Williamson states that the peer group method possesses better socio-
logical attributes, but is inferior to hierarchical alternatives because it fails to assign
workers to their most productive uses. See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of
Work: A Comparative Institutional Assessment, IJ. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 5, 37 (1980) (argu-
ing that nonhierarchial work makes common experience substantial transaction cost
disabilities).
29 See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 22, at 42-47.
30 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 78.
31 This term originated in Clark Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LABOR
MOBILrIY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 92 (1954).
32 In addition, employees must give up social contacts at work and may have to
change residences. See Thomas Eger & Peter Weise, Participation and Codetermination in a
Perfect and Imperfect World, in CODETERMINATION: A DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT AP-




marginal productivity for senior workers. In contrast to the implicit
assurances provided by their workers, firms do not bond their per-
formance to employees by providing the financial equivalent of job
market tolls. Labor economists explain that these bonds by firms
might take the form of severance payments when permanent job
loss results from bankruptcy, supply and demand shifts, and product
obsolescence.3 3 Most firms, however, do not provide severance pay-
ments in amounts sufficient to compensate employees for firm-spe-
cific investments.3 4 To a certain extent, employers indirectly bond
their performance to employees when they invest in immobile and
unsalvageable plant and equipment.3 5
For the most part, employees are left to rely upon a firm's repu-
tation for upholding implicit employment agreements. Firms that
fail to honor these obligations will acquire dishonorable reputations
that will impede efforts to attract and retain the most qualified work-
ers. Thus, these reputational sanctions operate both outside the
firm in the external labor market and within the firm among the ex-
isting employees. In the general labor market, one would presume
that the breach of implicit employment agreements would adversely
affect a firm's ability to compete for the most productive employees.
Yet many labor economists believe that this deterrent is weak be-
cause information regarding a firm's untrustworthiness is not suffi-
ciently transmitted throughout the labor market.36 A second feature
of the reputational sanction has a more substantial effect. Although
most employees are hired on an at-will basis, few employers arbi-
trarily dismiss workers. Employers value the appearance of an equi-
table personnel system, which is needed to maintain the morale,
33 See Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. ECON. Lrr. 1144, 1170-71
(1985).
34 See Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to
Demand, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 233, 250 (1984) (Because firm has monopsony power, some
degree of severance pay is desirable to offset that power.). Attempting to explain why
corporations often fail to provide severance payments, economists surmise that "the
temptation for the firm to renege on promised severance payments may be irresistible."
Larry Samuelson, Implicit Contracts with Heterogenous Labor, 3J. LAB. ECON. 70, 87 (1985)
(Implicit contract models often allow firms to make severance payments "presumably
because of the optimality of doing so."). In defending employment-at-will, Richard Ep-
stein recognizes that severance pay has advantages. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. Cmi. L. REv. 947, 967 (1984).
35 In addition, firms individually bond their performance through investments in
the hiring and training of new workers. See Clive Bull, Implicit Contracts in the Absence of
Enforcement and Risk Aversion, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 662-63 (1983); WilliamJ. Carney,
Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 392 (1990).
36 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 433, 442 (1984) (contending that prospective em-
ployees often do not know the employer's record, and previous dismissals may have
been legitimate).
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productivity, and loyalty of the current workforce.3 7 Although the
firm's interest in maintaining its reputation as a fair employer pro-
vides some assurance to employees, significant room for opportu-
nistic conduct by firms remains. Because employees lack adequate
safeguards to prevent the expropriation of their firm-specific invest-
ments, the successful operation of an internal labor market within a
firm depends upon the degree that the workforce trusts that man-
agement will not renege on its obligations under implicit employ-
ment agreements.
B. Restructuring Internal Labor Markets: Emerging Shopfloor
Practices
During the past twenty years, internal labor markets have been
undergoing a transformation on a world-wide scale as firms respond
to international market pressures by reshaping shopfloor prac-
tices. 38 Many corporations have shifted from the conventional bu-
reaucratic form of work organization to more flexible, participatory
work programs. 39 In general, large nonunionized firms employ the
participatory model, while the unionized steel and auto industries
have used the hierarchical system.40
The traditional system, known as "Taylorism," 41 seeks to maxi-
mize productivity by developing a high degree of specialization
among workers.42 In general, this system separates "thinking" work
from "doing" work in order to develop technical expertise. 43 To
37 See, e.g., Bull, supra note 35, at 662; Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 26, at 19.
38 Masahiko Aoki, The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and the Theory of the
Firm, in THE FIRM AS A NExus OF TREATIES 26, 27 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990)
[hereinafter TREATIES].
39 Eighty percent of the Fortune 1000 companies have implemented some form of
the participating work program. Current Developments, Daily Lab. Rptr. (BNA) No. 186, at
A-9 (Sept. 27, 1989).
40 See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
IN THE CHANGING CORPORATIONS 97 (1988) (For the most part, companies implementing
participatory programs seek to avoid unionization, although General Motors and Ford
are notable exceptions.).
41 These shopfloor practices began in the early twentieth century when industrial
engineer Frederick W. Taylor devised the method of production referred to as "scien-
tific management." FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911). For a detailed historical account of Taylorism, see DANIEL NELSON, FREDERICK
W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1980).
42 TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 32; see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY
CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (1974) ("The
separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of labor
taken by the capitalist mode of production.").
43 See, e.g., DAN CLAWSON, BUREAUCRACY AND THE LABOR PROCESS: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF U.S. INDUSTRY, 1860-1920 202 (1980) (describing Taylor as "the Napoleon of
the war against craft production"); REICH, supra note 1, at 68 ("Planning was to be dis-
tinct from execution, brain distinct from brawn, head from hand, white collar from'blue
collar."); Katherine Stone, The Origins ofJob Structures in the Steel Industry, in LABOR MAR-
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accomplish this task, the production process is segmented into in-
dependent work assignments involving simple, repetitive motions
that minimize the amount ofjudgment required by workers. Under
Taylorism, decisionmaking takes place through a centralized mana-
gerial planning department.44 The ultimate managerial authority
rests at the top of a pyramid-shaped hierarchy. At the lower levels
of this pyramid, managerial discretion is constrained by rigid work
rules. This hierarchical system stresses the importance of preserv-
ing managerial control over the production process by reducing the
firm's dependence upon labor cooperation. To ensure control,
Taylorism employs extensive monitoring based on the assumption
that workers will shirk their duties when given the opportunity.45 In
addition, jobs are defined narrowly so that workers are prevented
from understanding the production process so that they cannot re-
duce the pace of work and the amount of production. 46 In order to
minimize the risk that workers will limit production, Taylorism seeks
to inhibit worker solidarity by using discrete job assignments that
reduce the need for communication between employees. For these
reasons, Taylorism tends to produce an adversarial atmosphere that
leads to a low level of employee commitment. 47
Despite the employee alienation it engenders, Taylorism suc-
cessfully operated in the stable oligopolistic markets that existed in
the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. 48 During the 1970s,
however, this economic environment changed as global market
pressures reduced the competitiveness of the traditional mass pro-
duction industries in highly developed economies. 49 Comparative
advantages for firms in industrialized nations have since shifted to
more specialized production methods that are characterized by fre-
quent technological change and shorter product cycles. 50 Taylor-
ism, however, is not well-suited to respond to these developments.
Routinized production processes and fixed job classifications im-
pede firm efforts to respond quickly to new opportunities in a rap-
idly changing environment. Thus, use of the traditional system in
KET SEGMENTATION 27 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975) (employer strategies
designed to gain and maintain control over the work process).
44 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 65; BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 136.
45 See, e.g., REICH, supra note 1, at 64.
46 See, e.g., BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 125 ("Thus, in the setting of antagonistic
social relations, of alienated labor, hand and brain become not just separated, but di-
vided and hostile, and the human unity of hand and brain turns into its opposite, some-
thing less than human.").
47 Id.
48 See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 1, at 165-66.
49 See REICH, supra note 1, at 127.
50 Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28J. ECON. LIT. 1, 4
(1990).
912 [Vol. 78:899
THE HUMAN CAPITAL ERA
the United States is gradually declining as firms realize that compet-
ing in the global economy requires a high commitment to flexible
shopfloor practices.5 1
In redesigning production processes, many firms in the United
States have looked to the Japanese system of industrial relations.
Although the new practices differ widely among individual firms, the
emerging form of work organization generally attempts to raise pro-
ductivity by utilizing rather than suppressing worker knowledge. 52
Whereas Taylorism tends to stress passive obedience to rigid work
rules, these new programs entrust workers with increasing amounts
of responsibility in the interests of the company. Avoiding the time
delay caused by hierarchical planning, these programs delegate con-
trol over production processes to workers on the shopfloor where
useful on-the-spot information is available.53 In contrast to their
narrow job assignments under Taylorism, workers in the emerging
programs learn a variety of skills that allow them to rotate among
positions according to the firm's needs. 54 In this way, these pro-
grams develop the worker's problem-solving capabilities by sharing
knowledge on the shopfloor. By avoiding rigid, hierarchical chains
of authority,5 5 participating programs allow firms to respond more
quickly to market signals.56 Compared to Taylorism, these pro-
grams use relatively "flat" organizational structures because auton-
omous work teams perform many functions previously controlled by
managers. 57
C. Participatory Work Programs and the Transaction Cost
Model of the Firm
The transaction cost model of the firm provides a framework to
understand the implications that the recent changes in shopfloor
practices have for the structure of internal labor markets that oper-
ate within firms. Although the transaction cost model provides a
useful analysis of certain features of the emerging methods of work
organization, it contains several drawbacks. Exploring these weak-
nesses reveals ways in which the prevailing theory of the firm needs
51 Michael Piore and Charles Sabel described the changing shopfloor practice as
"flexible specialization." This is the term given to efforts "[t]o convert the traditional
highly integrated corporate structure into a more supple organizational form capable of
responding quickly to shifting market conditions and product demand." PIORE & SABEL,
supra note 1, at 231-36.
52 Aoki, supra note 38, at 27.
53 Id. at 27; Aoki, supra note 50, at 3.
54 Aoki, supra note 38, at 43.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 27.
57 REICH, supra note 1, at 246.
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to be revised to provide a richer and more complex view of the em-
ployees' changing role in the corporate structure.
1. The Efficiency Tradeoffs of Participatory Work Programs
Williamson's vision of the employment relationship parallels
the Taylorist view. In transaction cost terms, Taylorism reduces the
potential for opportunism by preventing workers from developing
an informational advantage concerning operational processes. 58 In
addition, Taylorism's strong emphasis upon control ensures that
managers maintain a strategic advantage over production matters.
Williamson maintains that the separation of "thinking" from "do-
ing" achieves efficiencies because "information-processing and de-
cision-making talents are not widely distributed." 59 He builds upon
this assumption to assert that a positive correlation exists between
efficiency and hierarchy. Specifically, Williamson maintains that
"centralization of information handling avoids the need for full
group discussion with little or no sacrifice in the quality of the deci-
sion." 60 Williamson, however, recognizes that hierarchial work
structures may have a negative impact on worker incentives and rec-
ommends that future research should focus upon issues of em-
ployee dignity and workplace atmosphere.6 1
58 Stone, supra note 43, at 19.
59 Williamson suggests:
What is especially relevant to the choice of peer group or simple hi-
erarchy is that, to the extent that the requisite information-processing
and decision-making talents are not widely distributed, efficiency will be
served by reserving the central information collection and decision-mak-
ing position to the one or few individuals who have superior information
processing capacities and exceptional oratorical and decision-making
skills. Something of an elite thereby results, as the select set bears an
asymmetrical relation to everyone else.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 52.
60 Id. at 46-47. Williamson states:
[Sluppose that adaptations to changing market circumstances are needed
in order to utilize resources efficiency. While a full group discussion
could be held to determine what adaptation is to be made, this is time
consuming and may yield little gain if-provided only that everyone pulls
in harness-any of a number of adaptations would work.
Id. at 47; see also WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 231, 239 (correlation between
the degree of hierarchy and efficiency). In response to the claim that hierarchy arises
because of the need to maintain control over workers, Williamson considers hierarchy to
be a generic element of the firm as an alternative to market transactions. He asserts:
"[h]ostility to hierarchy thus lacks a comparative institutional foundation. There may be
more or less preferred types of hierarchy; but hierarchy itself is unavoidable unless effi-
ciency sacrifices are made." Id. at 231.
61 Williamson recognizes that Taylorism creates a calculating atmosphere that leads
employees to perform their jobs in a minimal or "perfunctory" rather than a maximal or
"consummate" fashion. He indicates that participatory programs create a better atmos-
phere for workplace cooperation because less monitoring increases the workers dignity.
He states that peer group production fosters a better atmosphere because it allows the
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Although Williamson acknowledges that the peer group form of
production provides advantages for the workers' dignity, he ex-
presses great doubt that participatory work programs will achieve
greater productivity.62 At this point, conflicting empirical data pre-
vent a definite conclusion about the efficacy of the new shopfloor
practices.63 Williamson suggests that the positive impact upon at-
mosphere under participatory programs is outweighed by losses
that result from the reduction in the specialization of jobs and cen-
tralization in decisionmaking.64 When environments for planning
are stable, this may be the case. That is, the information acquired
on the shopfloor may not enhance centralized planning.65 Yet, the
opposite situation arises when fluctuating market conditions require
a flexible and creative workplace to respond rapidly to new produc-
tion processes. Under these conditions, the benefits gained by
greater communication at the shopfloor level under participatory
programs may more than compensate for the loss of skill specializa-
tion that results as a consequence of the workers' time spent in ac-
quiring new information. 66
2. Transaction Hazards and Participatory Work Practices
Compared to Taylorism, emerging shopfloor practices require
workers to invest in more firm-specific skills by developing their ca-
pacity to communicate information about production processes and
adapt to flexible work assignments. Yet, under current market con-
ditions, employees face a great deal of uncertainty when making
these additional investments. Specifically, employees fear that aban-
doning rigid work rules and sharing information about production
inefficiencies will lead to layoffs. 67 This fear is understandable given
the existing structure of internal labor markets. In stable economic
"transformation of 'involvement' relations, from a calculative to a more nearly
quasimoral mode .. " WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 44. Williamson also argues that
unless problems of alienation and workers' "dignity" are considered, the conception of
economic organization will be too narrow. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at
271 ("[C]apitalism is prone to undervalue dignity and that institutional safeguards can
sometimes be forged that help to correct the condition.").
62 WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM, supra note 8, at 270 ("Participation benefits raises a
serious doubt that efforts to effect participation can be justified on profitability
grounds.").
63 Id. at 269-70 (discussing conflicting studies).
64 Id. at 270.
65 Aoki, supra note 38, at 8-10.
66 Id.
67 THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN UNIONS:
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 42, 58-59 (1984) (Employees resist cooperating with innova-
tions in the workplace for fear ofjob loss.) [hereinafter KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICI-
PATION]; KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 119 (new work structures spur employee
interest in job security).
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environments, self-enforcing mechanisms concerning firms' reputa-
tions adequately prevent them from breaching implicit employment
agreements. However, the results of highly leveraged, bust-up ac-
quisitions dramatically illustrate the insufficiency of these extra-legal
measures to prevent the expropriation of human capital invest-
ments. 68 Reputational concerns are also unlikely to protect employ-
ees when a firm leaves a regional labor market and relocates to
another part of the country or world. 69 As the labor market be-
comes more volatile, long-term employment relationships become
less secure. 70 This instability frustrates attempts to reform shop-
floor practices and undermines the essential foundation needed for
the successful operation of internal labor market arrangements-
worker trust.
Because participatory programs raise employee concerns about
job security, firms using the new shopfloor practices will either have
to pay workers a wage premium to compensate for this risk or re-
duce the risk of opportunism. Competitive pressures may foreclose
the option of paying higher wages. Thus, firms will need to develop
transactional safeguards to ensure that employees will receive the
benefits of their firm-specific investments without fear of exploita-
tion. However, the traditional collective bargaining solution fails to
accomplish this task for two reasons. First, collective bargaining will
not induce employees to engage in cooperative efforts to improve
productivity and product quality. This kind of participation simply
cannot be written into detailed, contractual specifications. Second,
as the employment structure becomes more deeply internalized, the
employees' welfare becomes increasingly influenced by strategic de-
cisions involving job security, production processes, and investment
rates. Yet, these issues do not lend themselves to the collective bar-
gaining process. The reason is that neither management nor labor
has perfect foresight; thus, substantial problems of information and
enforcement that arise as a result of bounded rationality and oppor-
68 Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, 4 J.L. ECoN. & ORG.
49, 51 (1988) (discussing ex post enforcement problem due to opportunistic breach); An-
drei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 38 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988) ("[I]mplicit
contracts specify actions that ex post reduce the firm's value, even though agreeing to
these actions is ex ante value maximizing. Breach of contract can therefore raise share-
holder wealth, and the more so the greater is the burden of fulfilling past implicit con-
tracts."). Id. at 38.
69 Shleifer & Summers, supra note 68, at 39 (stating that an employer whose future
reputation is unimportant is likely to breach implicit agreements with employees).
70 See, e.g., BENNETr HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPO-
RATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 112-28 (1988) (discussing how
restructuring produces widespread alienation in the workplace); OSTERMAN, supra note
20, at 80 ("[W]orkers generally will feel less secure as they confront an economy in
which more of their neighbors, friends, and relatives are having trouble.").
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tunistic conduct impede efforts to protect employees against every
contingency in explicit contracts. Viewed in this light, collective
bargaining alone is insufficient to meet the needs of contemporary
labor relations in a changing world economy.
Under Williamson's analysis, workers should be granted a role
in corporate governance because participatory work programs re-
quire employees to make investments characterized by high asset
specificity and uncertainty. In two respects, however, the transac-
tion cost model fails to analyze the type of relational contracting
that is necessary for participatory work programs to succeed. First,
although Williamson asserts that internal labor markets create a
workplace atmosphere that motivates workers to provide consum-
mate cooperation, 7 1 Williamson never provides a detailed explana-
tion of why this result should occur. Second, Williamson focuses
almost exclusively upon the employers' problems controlling em-
ployee opportunism involving shirking. He tends to ignore employ-
ees' difficulties concerning firm opportunism, particularly the fact
that internal labor markets fail to prevent the expropriation of work-
ers' firm-specific investments.
To further explore the emerging shopfloor practices, we need
to shift the discussion of implicit employment agreements away
from the traditional goal of preventing shirking and toward the
more pressing problem of developing organizational arrangements
that are best suited to motivate a highly committed workforce to
utilize fully their information-processing and communicative abili-
ties. It is also necessary to focus upon the industrial conflict that
surrounds the implementation of participatory work programs by
analyzing the consequences of opportunistic conduct by both em-
ployers and workers. The next part explores these issues by devel-
oping a revised economic framework that incorporates literature in
the areas of strategic games, industrial relations, and relational
contracts.
II
PARTICIPATORY WORK PROGRAMS: AN X-EFFICIENCY
PERSPECTIVE
A. X-efficiency, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and Effort
Conventions
As the concept of the firm is expanded to encompass the em-
ployees' changing role, the concept of efficiency needs to be broad-
ened accordingly. Economist Harvey Leibenstein examines the
workers' ability to influence the internal efficiency of the firm's oper-
71 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 38-39.
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ations.72 Leibenstein begins with the premise that firms cannot
purchase labor like other factors of production. Although firms buy
worker time, the relevant consideration for productivity is the pace
and quality of the worker effort. 73 To a certain extent, employers
can control these factors by monitoring minimum standards and im-
posing sanctions for shirking. Above minimum standards, however,
workers have discretion to produce at higher levels. 74 In particular,
monitoring will not ensure that workers reveal information concern-
ing production inefficiencies.75 The way the firm treats its employ-
ees significantly influences the "X-factor"; that is, how inner-
motivated workers are to cooperate and produce. Within a certain
range, managers can modify worker incentives through wages and
working conditions. 76 Leibenstein explains that ignoring those
motivational considerations leads to a substantial amount of "X-
inefficiency. ' 77 As a result, this theory suggests that productivity
may differ among firms even if the other aspects of production are
the same.78
To demonstrate the implications of X-inefficiency, Leibenstein
regards productivity as a prisoners' dilemma game played by em-
ployees and managers making strategic decisions that are character-
ized by both conflicting and common goals. 79 Under this game,
workers and managers make basic choices about whether to cooper-
ate or defect in deciding the amount of work effort and the quality of
working conditions. Of course, the optimal solution involves em-
ployees choosing to provide the highest level of effort in return for
the best working conditions. Yet, the players face difficulties in
reaching the optimal solution because they cannot credibly commit
to achieve this outcome by using traditional explicit and implicit
contractual safeguards.
72 HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY 32
(1987) [hereinafter LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM]; HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND Eco-
NOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMICS 29 (1976) [hereinafter LEIBEN-
STEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN]. For a comparison of the X-efficiency model and the
transaction cost model, see Louis De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Effi-
ciency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 64, 76 (1983) (criticizing Leiben-
stein's model by asserting that X-inefficiency can be described in terms of transaction
costs); Louis De Alessi, Property Rights and X-Efficiency: A Reply, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 843
(1983) (same).
73 LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 72, at 98-99.
74 Id. at 98-100; LEiBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 99.
75 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 101-02.
76 Id. at 87.
77 LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 72, at 46-47, 94.
78 Id. at 100-01; LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 104.
79 For an introduction to game theory and the prisoners' dilemma see, e.g., DAVID M.
KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 29-39 (1990); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 27-30 (1979).
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On the one hand, employees face difficulty in giving credible
commitments to provide consummate cooperation because cost
considerations prevent firms from detecting the amount of the
workers' effort. Additionally, heavy monitoring creates a negative
work atmosphere that decreases productivity. Given these limita-
tions, firms could require employees to sacrifice a bond for failing to
perform according to the highest standards. However, this solution
would fail because employees probably lack the resources to provide
these bonds in amounts sufficient to guarantee consummate
cooperation.8 0
Employers also face barriers in providing credible commit-
ments for employment security. A widely accepted notion is that
employers do not offer complete job security because it would cause
employees to shirk.8 ' Yet, this "moral hazard" theory seems odd
because it is unlikely that a firm would ever agree to retain workers
who do not meet minimum performance standards. A better expla-
nation suggests that employers' inability to provide credible com-
mitments arises as a result of the transaction costs involved in
drafting and enforcing contracts for job security.82
Because transaction costs impede efforts to make credible com-
mitments, a party who chooses to cooperate when playing the pris-
oners' dilemma game has no assurance that the other player will
respond in a similar fashion. If both players cooperate, each re-
ceives a higher payoff than if both defect. But if one player defects
while the other cooperates, the defecting player receives the highest
return available, while the cooperating player receives the lowest re-
turn possible. Under this game, the dilemma arises because each
player has an opportunity to receive the larger return at the other's
expense by exploiting trusting behavior. Because each player is un-
80 Roger McCain, Transaction Costs, Labor Management, and Codetermination, 4 AD-
VANCES ECON. ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR MANAGED FIRMS 205, 213 (1992)
(discussing commitment problems); cf. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, Workers'
Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles, 104 QJ. ECON. 525 (1989) (during the early years
of service, the amount of the bond may be insufficient to provide much deterrence
against shirking; thus, deferred payment scheme and up-front bonds are not perfect
substitutes); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KEN" L. REV. 159 ("Real
world employees obviously do not have the resources to post such a bond.").
81 See, e.g.,Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 363; see generally Williamson, Credible
Commitments, supra note 8, at 519-20 (reporting that a mechanism designed to control the
opportunism of one party may well facilitate the opportunism of the other).
82 In drafting tin parachutes, Katherine Stone explains, it is difficult to specify all
the events that would trigger the parachute. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 60-64
(1991). Even if these contracting problems could be overcome, Stone explains that suc-
cessorship rules prevent unions from enforcing provisions in the event of certain
changes in control. Id. at 64. Enforcement is also impeded because arbitrators are re-
luctant to grant injunctive relief. Id. at 67.
1993] 919
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
certain how the other will behave, distrust leads each player to pur-
sue the strategy that maximizes individual gain while reducing the
risks of opportunism. Under this strategy, each player perceives
that, regardless of whether the other player decides to cooperate or
defect, the decision to defect will produce a higher return than the
decision to cooperate. This type of reasoning leads each player to
defect, producing an inferior outcome for both parties referred to as
the "prisoners' dilemma solution."
Applying this analysis to productivity, Leibenstein explains that
firms have an incentive to increase profits by obtaining the maxi-
mum amount of work effort at the lowest cost in terms of working
conditions. Similarly, workers have an incentive to obtain the best
working conditions in return for the lowest amount of effort possi-
ble. Under the prisoners' dilemma solution, employees supply the
lowest effort possible, regardless of the motivations provided by
managers. Similarly, managers will provide low motivations, re-
gardless of the effort put forth by employees.83 In contrast, if the
parties trust each other to cooperate, it is possible to attain the
"golden rule solution," in which employees provide maximum ef-
fort in return for optimal working conditions and wages.8 4
Leibenstein suggests that the prisoners' dilemma solution
rarely occurs because the parties establish conventions regarding
the appropriate amount of effort and working conditions.8 5 Certain
factors influence these "effort conventions," including the motiva-
tional forces operating within the firm, such as the plant's history of
industrial relations. These conventions are also affected by motiva-
tional forces operating outside the firm such as the degree of com-
petition. 6 Once performance patterns become routine, Leibenstein
maintains that effort conventions become quite stable.8 7 Workers as
a group assure adherence to the effort convention by training new
workers and applying social pressures for conformity.88 In this way,
83 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 50.
84 Id. at 96-97.
85 Id. at 77-78. When a game has multiple possible solutions, the one chosen may
depend upon conventional standards of behavior. A convention "is basically an agreed-
upon regularity of behavior appropriate within a certain set of contexts." Id. at 70. Fol-
lowing a convention is a "nonthinking, passive decision." Id. at 88. This behavior is
"stimulus-response" behavior. Id. at 83. For further discussion of how conventions
solve coordination games, see KREPS, supra note 79, at 65; see also ANDREW SCHOLLTER,
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITLrrIONS 11 (1981).
86 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 68.
87 Id. at 71.
88 Id. at 81; see also Aoki, supra note 50, at 26 ("Work customs generated and owned
collectively are transferable to new workers through 'social cohesion and group pres-
sures' rather than the market."). Some coordinating conventions do not need much
enforcement. One example is driving on the right-hand side of the road. People follow
this social practice in a non-instrumentally rational way. Yet, in the prisoners' dilemma,
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effort conventions that solve the prisoners' dilemma also solve the
free rider problem concerning an individual worker's incentive to
shirk when evaluated upon team performance.8 9
Although conventions regarding the level of work effort and the
quality of working conditions are normally sufficient to avoid the
prisoners' dilemma, Leibenstein asserts that these conventions usu-
ally fall far below those reached under the golden rule solution.90
In other words, a considerable amount of X-inefficiency exists
within firms in the United States due to adversarial labor relations.
Supporting this view, a recent study by the MIT Commission on In-
dustrial Relations emphasizes the lack of labor-management cooper-
ation as a significant factor for low productivity in the United
States.9'
Suboptimal conventions are unlikely to change unless managers
and workers learn to recognize and avoid the prisoners' dilemma
problem. Leibenstein suggests that this is unlikely to occur in the
absence of outside pressure because the inertia inherent in employ-
ment relationships creates disincentives to change established con-
ventions. 92 External market forces, however, tend to push the
parties to foster "cultural change" that promotes higher effort
norms.93 Similarly, industrial relations experts maintain that crisis
periods may be necessary to inspire labor-management cooperation
to raise productivity. 94
incentives exist to cheat. Thus sanctions are necessary to ensure that people abide by
the convention that avoids the prisoners' dilemma solution. Leibenstein suggests that
new workers will follow effort norms set by the workers as a group, even if the group
effort convention conflicts with the orders received from management. LEIBENSTEIN,
INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74-75.
89 Id. at 57.
90 Id. at 75-76; see also Aoki, supra note 50, at 26 ("[A]s a result of subsequent devel-
opment of technology in the society at large, conflicts between work customs and effi-
ciency may arise, and once-efficient customs may be turned into 'collective bads' from
the viewpoint of the firm.").
91 MICHAEL DERTOUZOUS ET AL., MIT COMMISSION, MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING
THE PRODUCTIVE EDGE 111, 140 (1989) (arguing that underdeveloped cooperation is a
major obstacle to technological innovation and the improvement of industrial perform-
ance); see also COMMISSION ON WORKFORCE QUALITY AND LABOR MARKET EFFICIENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INVESTING IN PEOPLE (1989) (same); DANIEL YANKELOVICH &
JOHN IMMERWAHR, PUTTING THE WORK ETHIC TO WORK: A PUBLIC AGENDA REPORT ON
RESTORING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVE VITAL=TY 25-30 (1983) (workers discuss a "commit-
ment gap" between their performance and the optimal level of performance).
92 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 73; LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECO-
NOMIC MAN, supra note 72, at 111-13.
93 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 59, 73.
94 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13-15 (periods of significant strategic
adjustment give rise to a wider variety of choices and experiments); Jack Barbash, Do We
Really Want Labor on the Ropes?, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 10 ("Hard times"
may be the essential condition of cooperation).
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By emphasizing how productivity depends upon strategic inter-
actions between managers and employees, Leibenstein captures sig-
nificant aspects of the employment relationship that labor
economists often ignore. Specifically, the theory of effort conven-
tions explains why internal labor markets alone may not necessarily
promote consummate cooperation. Accordingly, Leibenstein's X-
efficiency theory provides the basis to assess how participatory work
programs have changed the rules of the productivity game within
firms.
B. Participatory Work Programs and the Changing Nature of
the Productivity Game
Leibenstein's framework suggests that although Taylorism cre-
ates worker alienation and low effort norms,95 firms had few incen-
tives to reduce X-inefficiency when the United States was mostly
isolated and economically unrivaled. Global market pressures, how-
ever, have pushed firms to raise effort conventions by providing
higher motivations for workers through participatory work pro-
grams. Once effort conventions are destabilized, however, it is not
clear whether strategic bargaining between managers and workers
over the dynamics of readjustment will lead to a superior or inferior
solution for both players, or an outcome under which one player
benefits at the other's expense. On the one hand, new shopfloor
practices create an opportunity to reach the golden rule solution if
workers raise effort norms and employers offer better working con-
ditions. On the other hand, participatory work programs may result
in greater X-inefficiency because the players can move in the oppo-
site direction towards the prisoners' dilemma solution: employees
may withdraw their commitment to the workplace if they perceive
incentive patterns as inadequate and firms can respond to lower ef-
fort norms by adopting less desirable work arrangements in order to
maintain control. 96
Thus, although managers and employees are beginning to see
the need for cooperation to increase productivity, the prisoners' di-
lemma problem still exists because each side must trust the other to
fulfill the terms of the new implicit employment arrangements. This
section analyzes the changing nature of the productivity game and
the factors that may influence how managers and employees will
adapt to the new rules under participatory work programs.
95 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 56 (Taylorism "saw only half the
picture" by missing motivational factors and prisoners' dilemma aspects of production.).
96 Id. at 58.
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1. The Additional Risks of Opportunism
One of the most significant developments in the productivity
game has not received much attention. Compared to Taylorism,
participatory work programs involve a shift in control over produc-
tion decisions by providing employees on the shopfloor with more
bargaining power in three ways. 97 First, participatory work pro-
grams depend upon a highly committed and flexible workforce.
Thus, the employees' ability to establish effort norms has a signifi-
cant impact upon productivity.98 Second, employees as a group
gain additional leverage because these programs require workers to
develop firm-specific skills. Consequently, it is more difficult for the
firm to replace these workers. 99 Third, "high-discretion" work-
places provide opportunities to develop an informational advantage
concerning production processes. 00 Thus, viewing the game from
the firm's perspective, managers face a great deal of risk in imple-
menting participatory work programs because these sources of
power provide workers with greater ability to threaten to withhold
their cooperation when firms become dependent on the workers'
flexibility and knowledge. 1 1 Although employers have no assur-
ance of consummate cooperation, the internal labor market pro-
vides employers with some protection against opportunistic conduct
because employees bond a certain level of performance by accepting
lower wages during their early years of service. 10 2
The higher risks of exploitation under participating work pro-
grams run the other way as well. These new shopfloor practices fre-
quently require workers to make additional investments in firm-
specific knowledge that increase the difference in opportunity costs
between working for the given firm and the next best alternative. As
these opportunity costs increase, the workers' vulnerability to op-
portunism also rises. Specifically, after workers acquire these skills,
the firm may renege on the implicit agreement by reducing working
conditions to the level provided to workers without these
abilities. 103
97 Aoki, supra note 50, at 25.
98 Id. at 32.
99 Id. at 102.
100 Id. at 54.
101 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Politics of Cooperation in the Workplace, RECONSTRUC-
TION, Winter 1990, at 18, 22 (participatory programs provide workers with more power).
102 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
103 Jonathan Macey notes:
Unlike high-level managers, who make firm-specific human capital invest-
ments as individuals, rank-and-file workers are often trained as groups
and make firm specific human capital investments simultaneously with
their co-workers. This arrangement contains additional potential for ex-
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Compared to the safeguards that internal labor markets provide
employers, workers have significantly less protection from opportu-
nistic conduct by firms. When firms change their production prac-
tices, workers lose safeguards previously provided under Taylorism.
Specifically, the routinized production processes of Taylorism re-
strain the firm's ability to reduce the workforce during a period of
low demand. Additionally, the uniform enforcement of rigid work
rules restricts arbitrary decisionmaking at lower managerial
levels. 10 4 Workers are reluctant to give up these protections be-
cause they fear that participatory work programs may lead to job
loss and more intense work standards, commonly referred to as
"speed ups. 10 5 Once firms establish participatory programs, how-
ever, employees gain some security because the new shopfloor prac-
tices make it difficult to replace team members. Although workers
gain some protection, significant room for opportunistic conduct by
firms remains.
Two factors compound the employees' risk. First, managers
have an informational advantage concerning the employees' impact
on firm profitability. This informational asymmetry causes employ-
ees to be suspicious of managements' motives in implementing par-
ticipatory work programs. This skepticism toward management
initiatives is often reinforced when the strategic policies decided at
the highest level of the firm adopt an adversarial approach to labor
relations while seeking to promote a cooperative atmosphere on the
shopfloor.10 6 For example, many firms using new participatory
techniques simultaneously engage in egregious unfair labor prac-
tices. 10 7 Such actions lead workers to fear that managers may at-
tempt to take an excessive share of the firm surplus by announcing
that production is less than it actually is in order to steadily raise
work requirements and decrease working conditions.108 The sec-
ploitation, because firms enjoy economies of scale in hiring and training
workers.
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 191.
104 The use of the rigid enforcement of job rules is referred to as 'job control
unionism." See, e.g., BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 96-100; Michael J. Piore, American
Labor and the Industrial Crisis, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 25.
105 See, e.g., GUILLENMU J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND
ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1988) (cooperative programs used to reduce the
influence of unions); MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND
THE TEAM CONCEPT 5 (1988) (describing management pressure tactics used to force
workers to accept cooperative work programs and union resistance to such tactics).
106 KOCHAN ET AL., Supra note 1, at 15-17.
107 Id. at 19; KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION, supra note 67, at 272-73.
108 For general discussion of opportunistic conduct by firms using informational ad-
vantage, see, e.g., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 26, at 12; Robert E. Hall & David M.
Lilien, Efficient Wages Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 868,
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ond factor that increases employees' risk concerns their relative im-
mobility10 9 compared to the international mobility of capital. 110
Even when a firm has remained in a region for a long period of time,
this mobility gives employers a potent bargaining tool.
Also, workers are disadvantaged because employees tend to in-
vest their lives in a corporation and only hold one job.11  Thus,
although participatory work programs create additional opportuni-
ties for each player to attempt to gain at the other's expense, the
employees' combined lack of information, risk-aversion, and immo-
bility place them at a distinct disadvantage in playing the productiv-
ity game.
2. The Potential for a Prisoners' Dilemma Solution
To increase workers' commitment to new shopfloor practices,
many firms offer to use their best efforts to prevent layoffs and plant
closings.1 12 However, providing effective assurances of employ-
ment stability has become more difficult because the corporate re-
structuring era has brought about a sudden change in labor
relations. Industrial relations experts suggest that opportunistic be-
havior by some firms in implementing mass layoffs and plant clos-
ings has widespread effects. Specifically, this opportunistic behavior
has created a "survival of the fittest" atmosphere that causes the
labor market as a whole to become less secure."13 This instability
871 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Equilibrium Long Term Labor Contracts, 98 QO.J. ECON. 23,
48 (Supp. 1983).
109 See, e.g., Diane E. Herz, Worker Displacement in a Period of RapidJob Expansion: 1983-
87, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 21, 30 (1990) (one out of six displaced workers moved to
another city or country to find employment betweenJanuary 1983 and 1988); Francis W.
Horvath, The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers of 1981-85, 110 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 3, 10 (1987) (figures slightly lower than subsequent survey).
110 See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETr HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 57 (1980) (stating that the
root of the plant closure crisis is the great speed with which capital is moved around the
world).
111 Clyde Summers states:
If the corporation is conceived in relatively narrow terms as an oper-
ating institution combining all factors of production to conduct an on-
going business, then the employees who provide the labor are as much
members of that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital.
Indeed, the employees may have made a much greater investment in the
enterprise by their years of service, may have much less ability to with-
draw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise than
many of the stockholders.
Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Poten-
tials, 4J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
112 For a general discussion of the strategies firms use to provide job security, see,
e.g., JOCELYN F. GUTCHESS, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY IN ACTION: STRATEGIES THAT WORK
(1988) (retraining workers, using temporary labor, and allowing older workers to retire).
113 OsTERMAN, supra note 20, at 77-86.
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has led to a sense of alienation, distrust, and impermanence in the
workplace; even employees who have not directly experienced job
loss recognize the potential for exploitation as they watch their
friends and family members suffer from the harsh consequences of
displacement.' 14- Translated into the X-inefficiency framework,
Leibenstein's analysis suggests that these external shocks to the la-
bor market may lead to lower effort levels in firms throughout the
United States. In the future, this problem may become more severe
because international competition is likely to cause rapid corporate
restructuring to become a permanent feature of the United States'
economy. 1 15
Viewed in this light, intensifying global market pressures in-
crease the risk that employees' concerns about employment stability
will conflict with managers' efforts to contain costs. Given this coun-
try's history of adversarial labor relations and the greater potential
for opportunistic conduct under participatory work programs, the
stage is set for an atmosphere of conflict and mistrust. Under the
prisoners' dilemma analysis both players may adopt strategies that
protect their interests in the face of worst case assumptions about
the other, leading to mutual withdrawal and reflexive hostility. To
illustrate, economic pressures may force managers to reduce work-
ing conditions. These actions may result in workers withdrawing
their commitment from the workplace in the form of lower effort
conventions. In turn, these countermoves "will be hailed by skep-
tics as evidence of original sin which justified the low-discretion
work design in the first place," 1 6 leading managers to revert to
traditional shopfloor practices.
While this is a rather negative scenario, it is unfortunately the
path that a very large number of firms may follow because the ex-
isting environment may cause the pull toward the prisoners' di-
lemma solution to be stronger than the pull toward the golden rule
solution. Indeed, industrial relations experts caution that the spiral
of low trust and high conflict may dominate participatory work pro-
grams. 1 7 Robert Reich explains that labor and management are
caught in a "vicious circle," because "as the economy continues to
decline, Americans grow more cynical about collective endeavor;
their consequential retreat into egoism merely accelerates the de-
cline since collaboration is the only way to reverse it."118 In other
words, workers and managers are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma
114 Id.
115 KOCHAN r AL., supra note 1, at 228.
116 ALAN Fox, BEYOND CoNTRAcr: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 116-17
(1974).
117 KocHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 165.
118 REICH, supra note 1, at 239.
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that makes it difficult for existing facilities in the United States to
compete.
The sum of these individually rational actions, however, falls far
short of the golden rule solution that could be achieved with trust-
ing collaboration. Participatory programs have the potential to lead
to greater X-efficiency because the parties can move in virtuous, as
well as vicious, circles. Specifically, workers should be to willing to
increase firm productivity in return for greater control over the stra-
tegic decisions of the corporation and some guarantee ofjob secur-
ity.119 The next section explores in detail theories of how players
break free of the adversarial cycle that leads to the prisoners' di-
lemma solution.
C. Solving the Prisoners' Dilemma Presented by Participatory
Work Programs
1. Repeated Play of the Game and the Limits of Economic Theory
The prisoners' dilemma is a noncooperative game, a game in
which the players cannot make credible commitments to cooper-
ate.' 20 Economists suggest, however, that repeated play of a non-
cooperative game usually produces results similar to those achieved
under a cooperative game in which such commitments are possi-
ble. 121 Specifically, repetition allows the implicit agreement to re-
frain from opportunism to become self-enforcing because each
player recognizes that the decision to defect in any round of play
will trigger a similar response from the other player in the next
round. 122 The combination of the fear of retaliation for defecting
and the prospect of future benefits from cooperating may cause the
players to reach a mutually beneficial solution. Once the players
make the initial move to cooperate, a "lock-in" effect arises that pro-
motes a pattern of collaboration through the game. In the case of
participatory work programs, repeated play of the productivity game
may lead to the golden rule solution. That is, commitments to at-
tain the golden rule solution would be enforced by the threat that,
should the employees defect by reducing their effort levels, the em-
ployers would reciprocate in the following round with declining
working conditions.
But there is a problem. An "end-game problem" arises that
threatens cooperation if the parties know in advance when the rela-
119 See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 50, at 47.
120 KREPS, supra note 79, at 29.
121 This is the so-called "folk theorem" on noncooperative game theory. See, e.g.,
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CooPERATIoN 32 (1984).
122 Id. (describing this as the "tit-for-tat" strategy); KREPS, supra note 79, at 65-71.
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tionship will terminate. 123 Under these conditions, cooperation is
no longer beneficial during the last round of play because there will
be no punishment for cheating; thus both players have an incentive
to defect during the last round in order to capture the largest payoff.
The end-game situation poses a serious problem because each
player's strategy for a certain round must be part of optimal strategy
for the entire game. If cooperation is not optimal during the last
round, than there can be no threat of retaliation on the next to the
last round and the parties will have an incentive to defect during the
next to the last stage of the game. Continuing this scenario, game
theory models predict that cooperation will quickly unravel because
it will no longer be optimal on any round of play.
That production may be viewed as a repeated game does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the golden rule solution
will occur. Indeed, during periods of economic decline, both work-
ers and managers have incentives to pursue the "end-game" strat-
egy. As the last round approaches, productivity may fall as workers
attempt to expropriate capital surplus. High relative wages and low
productivity in the American auto and steel industries may be the
result of such end-game scenarios.' 24 Managers can also play the
end-game because they no longer have the incentive to maintain
their reputations for trustworthiness. Thus, managers may seek to
renege upon implicit employment agreements by expropriating the
workers' share of the firm surplus in the form of deferred compensa-
tion and wages.
Economists suggest that cooperation is more likely under re-
peated games because rational parties learn that cooperative behav-
ior is efficient. 125 Yet, game theory does not explain why parties
choose to cooperate in the first place, what produces the lock-in ef-
fect in repeated games, and what prevents the end-game problem.
The missing ingredient in game theoretic reasoning concerns "one
of the most fragile, yet powerful human dispositions-interpersonal
trust."' 126 When parties lack mutual trust, the prisoners' dilemma
123 See KREPS, supra note 79, at 66; Richard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 THEORY
& DEcISION 127 (1978).
124 See Colin Lawrence & Robert Z. Lawrence, Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End
Game Interpretation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTivrrY 47, 52 (Brainard & Perry
eds., 1985).
125 AXELROD, supra note 121, at 56.
126 Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends Nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting
in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 201 (Das-
puta Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE RELATIONS]; see also David M. Kreps
et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY
245 (1982) (End game problem will not arise if players are people who on moral
grounds would never abuse trust or irrationally follow tit-for-tat strategy.). For criticism
of game theory models for avoiding issues concerning trust, see, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON
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solution occurs because mistrust causes the pull toward adversarial
behavior to be stronger than that toward cooperative behavior. 127
To overcome the prisoners' dilemma, it is necessary to have action
that is beyond individual rational choice. In other words, a "group
rationality" solution is necessary to reach the golden rule
solution.' 28
Surprisingly, social scientists have not devoted much attention
to the analysis of trust and distrust in social relationships.129 One
possible definition of trust is: "action that (1) increases one's vulner-
ability to another whose behavior is not under one's control, and (2)
takes place in a situation where the penalty suffered if the trust is
abused would lead one to regret the action."' 30 Emphasizing the
emotional aspect of trust, William Bratton asserts that trust involves
"a fellow feeling, based on the good will of others."' 13 1 When trust
is abused, these "fellow feelings" produce guilt and the risk of social
disgrace and condemnation.' 3 2 Because of these feelings, parties
can make credible commitments that they will not engage in future
opportunistic conduct. 3 3 Most importantly, parties cannot provide
credible commitments to refrain from self-interest unless the feel-
ings of trust and confidence are heartfelt. 134
Although economists recognize that trust is an efficient mecha-
nism to reduce negotiating and monitoring costs, 135 it is difficult to
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987); Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 341, 342 (1985).
127 See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON 252-53 (1988) (Experi-
ments show people cooperate when they expect others to cooperate; they defect when
they expect others to defect.).
128 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74.
129 BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 5 (1983); NIKLAS LUHMANN,
TRUST AND POWER 8 (1979).
130 Lorenz, supra note 126, at 197; see also Barber, id. at 21 ("[Tlrust is an integrative
mechanism that creates and sustains solidarity in social relationships and systems.");
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, U. To-
RONTo LJ. (forthcoming 1993) ("Trust means that some individual, somewhere in the
economy, must be making a voluntary choice against the alternative which would maxi-
mize her preferences or, at least, must be able to get others to believe that she will do
just that.").
131 William W. Bratton,Jr., Self-Interest and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
132 See, e.g., LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 36.
133 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 127, at 5 ("Being known to experience certain emo-
tions enables us to make commitments that would otherwise not be credible.").
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., KENNETHJ. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (Looking at trust as
a commodity, but noting that "[i]f you have to buy it, you already have some doubts
about what you've bought."); see also Partha Dasgupata, Trust as a Commodity, in COOPERA-
TIVE RELATIONS, supra note 126, at 53 (Trust reduces negotiation and monitoring costs
by protecting expectations in situations that are not covered explicitly in the agree-
ment.); Williamson, supra note 19, at 240-41.
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discuss this behavior using the language of the self-interested, ra-
tional actor paradigm. Technically, economists do not use the term
"self-interest" to mean "selfish;" rather the term encompasses many
values including altruism.' 36 Yet, James Boyd White doubts that
this is possible, asserting: "one cannot habitually think of human
action in such terms-especially in a culture like our own, which is
so heavily dominated by the motive of self-interest in the usual
sense, that of selfishness or self-centeredness-without tending to
universalize their ordinary rather than their technical meanings."' 3 7
The language of economics fails to encompass the reality of moral
commitments because it has no way of discussing the concept of
trust except by treating it as a commodity that can be exchanged.
Discussing trust as a commodity is not only dehumanizing, 138 it
is also self-defeating because genuine trust is not experienced in
utilitarian terms.13 9 In other words, the moral person values trust
for its own sake, not as a matter of material gain. The language of
economics do exemplify certain types of thinking found throughout
our culture. In times of economic decline, the moral person who
fails to pursue self-interest is simply a "chump. ' 140 Ironically, the
chump's moral sentiments confer material advantages in the long-
run because refraining from the short-run pursuit of self-interest al-
136 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-4 (4th ed. 1992).
137 JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM 55 (1990).
138 See, e.g., AMrTAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION-TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 8
(1988) (To economists "a high level of trust reflects not successful socialization but
either numerous prior reiterations, small stakes, or high verification costs."); ROBIN
MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 93
(1990) ("Respect for individual liberty and human dignity require a recognition of the
need for moral dialogue separate and apart from the analysis of costs and benefits in a
purely neoclassical economic sense."); WHITE, supra note 137, at 37 (forms of life
presented by economics contain ethical hazards); WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8,
at 405 n.20 ("The calculative orientation that economists bring to bear advantageously
on other matters may be a disability on this. Organization theory specialists, being less
committed to the rational spirit, have less baggage to content with."); William Simon,
Social-Republican Proerty, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1388-89 (1992) ("Commodification
undermines the sense of intrinsic satisfaction in economic activities by eroding the sense
of connection between the activity of work and its social meaning and by eroding the
experience of work as membership in a community."); Bratton, supra note 131 (Descrip-
tions of cooperation based on individual self-interest fail because it is not possible to
"eras[e] the ethics of good will from a positive picture that recognizes cooperation as a
maximizing instrument."). These limitations of economics may explain why the growth
of the law and economics movement in law schools may be slowing down. See, e.g., Rob-
ert Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to RationalActors" A Critique of Classical Law
and Economics, 65 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 23, 23 (1989).
139 ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY 37 (Loyalty is more effective when
employees have a strong attachment to a firm that is similar to other firms.); Bratton,
supra note 131 ("useful ethics are never mere utilitarian instruments").
140 Id. at 249.
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lows credible commitments at a lower cost.' 4 1 That is, the chump's
emotional predisposition allows other parties to confer trust even
when the moral person's actions cannot be monitored. Thus, one
must come to terms with the factors that conventional economic
analysis defines as "extra-economic" by discussing altruistic or
"non-opportunistic" motivations for behavior.
2. Gift Exchanges and Loyalty Filters
Sociologist George Akerlof incorporates notions of trust and
loyalty into the theory of implicit employment arrangements. 42
Akerlof examines a group of employees who produced more than
the minimum required by the firm without the expectation of re-
wards. Other economists account for this behavior by suggesting
that employees who enjoy their jobs provide consummate coopera-
tion because they suffer deep regret if they jeopardize their posi-
tions by shirking.' 43 Yet, in the case studied by Akerlof, the workers
faced only a mild sanction for performance below the minimum. To
explain this seemingly irrational behavior, Akerlof presents an alter-
native model of implicit employment agreements that describes em-
ployees and managers in a trading relationship of partial gift
exchanges. Under this model, norms of gift exchange develop dur-
ing the employment relationship whereby the firm relaxes work
rules and employees show their appreciation and obligation by pro-
viding gifts that consist of diligent work or consummate coopera-
tion. 144 Akerlof suggests that workers receive utility from making
gifts to the firm because they acquire sentiment for each other and
for the firm.145
Under this gift-exchange model, moral obligations influence
the parties' cost-benefit calculations. Amitai Etzioni explains that
moral values "define, often loosely, what is within the range and
what is beyond the pale."' 146 Social conventions inherent in the em-
ployment relationship allow general understandings of acceptable
behavior for the gift exchange. Specifically, the reciprocal nature
141 Id. at 237.
142 George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, in EFFICIENCY WAGE
MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 66 (George Akerlof & Jane Yellen eds., 1986). See gener-
ally Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972) (discussing
rival use of gift and exchange as a means of allocating resources).
143 Jurgen Backhaus, Workers' Participation Stimulated by the Economic Failure of Tradi-
tional Organization: An Analysis of Some Recent Institutional Development, in CODETERMINA-
TION, supra note 32, at 227, 241. Akerlof also notes that conventional economic analysis
has difficulty explaining why the workers produced more than required and why the firm
did not raise the minimum standard. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 66.
144 Id. at 73.
145 Id.
146 ETzIONI, supra note 138, at 75.
1993]
932 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 78:899
gift exchanges suggest that if one party fails to meet the others' ex-
pectations, the other party will respond by withholding its gifts.1 47
For example, if the firm fires a slow worker, the other workers usu-
ally respond by lowering the effort norm as a sanction. 148
Akerlof's model suggests that the gift exchange nature of em-
ployment relationships plays a central role in shaping employees'
moral commitment to coworkers and the firm, as well as providing
them with a sense of fulfillment. In another article, Akerlof in-
troduces the concept of "loyalty filters."' 49 He suggests that when
people go through experiences, frequently their loyalties and values
change. 150 Because parties have a choice over their experiences,
they can exercise some choice over their values by actively pursuing
certain loyalty filters. 15 1 By using the notion of loyalty filters to ex-
plore preferences, one can examine the organizational and cultural
devices that make trust possible. This analysis, however, challenges
the mainstream economic assumption that preference-shaping
processes are exogenous to market transactions.
In sum, gift exchanges and loyalty filters have important conse-
quences for the changing nature of implicit employment agreements
under participatory work programs. Specifically, they suggest that
extra-economic elements like altruism and loyalty may coincide with
greater X-efficiency. The next section explores how firms using par-
ticipatory shopfloor practices are attempting to provide loyalty fil-
ters by developing corporate cultures that seek to foster high-trust
147 See Akerlof, supra note 142, at 73.
148 Id. at 86.
149 George Akerlof, Loyalty Filters, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 54 (1983).
150 Akerlof explains:
The modeling of each of these aspects of reality constitutes a departure
of importance from standard economic models, capable of explaining
such phenomena as cooperative behavior, class loyalties and much insti-
tutional behavior. While the latter allows for the fractional satisfaction of
preferences in their changed form, and so appears quite conventional in
its continued instrumental approach to individual choice, it is, neverthe-
less, still a quite unconventional and non-instrumental approach to insti-
tutions, or games, in that now these are seen not only as devices through
which individuals seek to satisfy given preferences, but also as mecha-
nisms through which their given preferences are changed.
Id. at 62.
151 Id. at 56 (teaching children a code to act against their own short-run interest
even while it serves their long-run economic interests); see also FRANK, supra note 127, at
69 (The commitment model requires "a central role for cultural conditioning in the
acquisition of moral sentiments. People may even make rational choices about the sorts
of conditioning they expose themselves to."); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Legal Persons and Moral
Worlds: Ethical Choices Within the Corporate Environment, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 75, 75 (1991)
("Preferences are never entirely exogenous; the corporate environment affects in signifi-
cant ways the character of ethical decision-making by individuals within its hierarchy.").
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work relations which encourage worker identification with the com-
pany and its goals.' 52
3. The Role of Loyalty Filters in Reshaping Corporate Culture
This section focuses upon the role of the firm as a social institu-
tion to examine how corporate cultures involve unwritten rules of
the productivity game that establish norms of behavior for firm
members.' 53 By focusing upon these norms, it is possible to see
how the policies that underlie shopfloor practices significantly influ-
ence the way people perceive both labor relations and corporations.
For example, one cannot overstate the effect that the historical sepa-
ration of "thinkers" from "doers" has had upon our culture.' 54
Taylorism reduces the need for firms to rely upon the gift exchange
aspect of the employment relationship by using specialized job as-
signments and heavy monitoring. Consequently, moral commit-
ments to coworkers and firm loyalty are less important for
production.
The shift from Taylorism to participatory work programs repre-
sents a transition from "low trust" to "high trust" work relations.' 55
Under participatory work programs, employers have significant re-
sponsibilities; these programs are implemented with the expectation
that this high level of trust will be reciprocated by employees on the
shopfloor by providing greater effort and creativity. This reliance
upon the gift exchange aspect of work relations implies a more gen-
eral change of customs, attitudes, and values that are part of our
cultural heritage. In order to facilitate this gift exchange, firms seek
152 In a sense, the corporate culture defines well understood rules for the productiv-
ity game which economize on bounded rationality. Thus, corporate culture has some-
thing of the nature of firm-specific capital. Similarly, firm loyalty, like other firm-specific
human capital investments, increase the workers' value to the firm, but are of no particu-
lar benefit to other firms. See, e.g., Jacques Cremer, Common Knowledge and the Co-ordina-
tion of Economic Activities, in TREATIES, supra note 38, at 53, 59; see also David Kreps,
Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PosrrIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
(James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds., 1990).
153 In contrast to this view of the firm as a social institution, neoclassical economic
theory perceives the firm as a series of market-like contracts. Alchian and Demsetz ex-
emplify this view:
To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is
a deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both par-
ties. Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that docu-
ment is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than
that brand of bread.
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777. In my view, the firm represents a social insti-
tution involving informal codes of behavior that serve as substitutes for this type of mar-
ket-like contracting.
154 See REICH, supra note 1, at 173.




to change traditional work attitudes by developing environments
that are more conducive to higher performance and morale. As a
result, participatory work practices have given rise to attempts to
promote a shared "culture" or corporate value system. 156 In devel-
oping these corporate value systems, firms establish informal moral
codes for cooperative behavior that promote group success by en-
couraging employees to act in the firm's best interests rather than
their own.
Because employees and managers have incompatible goals, it
would be irrational for either party to exhibit totally trusting atti-
tudes. Yet, the employment relationship is conducive to mutual
trust because it is characterized by mutual dependence.1 57 A party
that is receptive towards a trusting relationship can send signals to
the other party that it is safe to develop trust. 158 Once trust is given,
it can be maintained by continuously sending signals to foster "sys-
tems trust." Under systems trust, people overcome informational
barriers by relying instead upon the structural properties of their
relationship with the other party. 159
Firms implementing participatory work programs attempt to
foster systems trust in two ways. First, many of these firms are mov-
ing away from hierarchical enforcement of corporate goals. Hierar-
chy signals that managers are more important to the firm than
workers and that workers cannot be trusted.1 60 Consequently, hier-
archy creates distance and separation between members at different
levels of the organization.1 6 1 In contrast, participatory shopfloor
practices attempt to nurture the employment relationship by reduc-
ing supervision and increasing job satisfaction and employee com-
mitment. Firms use non-authoritarian management styles to create
156 For a general discussion of different types of corporate cultures see, e.g., TER-
RENCE E. DEAL & ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RrrES AND RrrUALS OF
CORPORATE LIFE (1987) (how to create more cooperation culture); WILLIAM G. OUCHI,
THEORY Z (1987) (corporate culture in Japanese firms); PAUL THOMPSON & DAVID Mc-
HUGH, WORK ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1990) (critical analysis of the
merchandising of corporate cultures); WILLIAM H. WHYrE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN
(1956) (criticizing how the corporate culture shapes the values of middle managers).
For the impact that changing corporate cultures has on the new shopfloor practices, see,
e.g., Irene Goll, Environment, Corporate Ideology, and Employee Involvement Programs, 30 IN-
DUS. REL. LJ. 138 (1991) (survey of 159 manufacturing companies concludes that cor-
porate ideology has a significant effect on participative practices in both union and
nonunion settings).
157 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 37.
158 Id. at 28, 37; FRANK, supra note 127, at 98, 105.
159 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 37 (explaining use of systems trust). See generally
HIRSHMAN, supra note 139, at 79 ("[T]he most loyalist behavior retains an enormous
dose of reasoned calculation.").
160 HECKSCHER, supra note 40, at 88.
161 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 101 (Workers cannot "judge how
relatively unknown and faceless members of the bureaucracy will react.").
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a climate of trust and to encourage employer identification with the
company's goals. Second, firms using the new shopfloor practices
hold periodic group meetings to promote social and emotional ties
among coworkers. 162 These meetings also reinforce the cultural
conditioning necessary for employees to internalize the norms and
values of the organization.
Efforts to create a more cooperative climate on the shopfloor by
reducing monitoring and building team spirit usually have some
positive influence upon the workplace atmosphere. 163 It is unlikely,
however, that these attempts to reshape the corporate culture will
encourage a great amount of trust.164 These signals for developing
systems trust do not have much credibility because they are inex-
pensive and easy to fake. 165 Under the new corporate cultures, the
most important factors that lead to the low-trust syndrome between
managers and workers remain ineffectual. For example, firms send
conflicting signals when workers are laid off during the course of a
participatory program. 166 Consequently, recent steps taken to pro-
mote cooperation do not remove the threat of industrial conflict.
Indeed, studies indicate that employee trust and confidence in man-
agement practices has declined in the last decade.' 67
Although recent attempts to change the corporate culture in-
volve low-risks steps, these efforts are significant because they raise
issues concerning the social organization of the corporation and
preference-shaping processes, which have not received much atten-
tion in the past. Specifically, the focus upon corporate culture raises
questions about the gift exchange nature of the employment rela-
tionship and how this gift exchange can be supported by providing
162 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 127, at 239 ("[F]eelings of moral responsibility are
much more focused on people with whom we have close personal ties. This suggests
that shirking might be attacked by creating a work environment that fosters closer per-
sonal ties between coworkers.").
163 See, e.g., KocHAN r AL., supra note 1, at 87 (short-term effects on changes);
THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 234 ("At least some of the hoop-la and con-
trived events could produce a stream of Hawthorne effects of a short-lived and superfi-
cial nature."); C.A. Roy, Corporate Culture: The Last Frontier of Control, 23 J. MGMT. STUD.
287, 292-93 (1986) ("[W]hile bureaucratic control may prompt individuals to act as if
the company is a source of meaning and commitment, that is an entirely different matter
from seriously believing it.").
164 See, e.g., THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 99; Jeremy Brecher, Uncovering
the Hidden History of the American Workplace, 10 REv. RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 20 (1978) (New
corporate cultures involve "window dressing which leaves untouched the essential tyr-
anny of the capitalist labor process.").
165 THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 99.
166 See, e.g., KocHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION, supra note 67, at 58-59; Mare,
Debate, supra note 5, at 66-67.
167 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 214 (About one-half of the workforce
remains skeptical of top management's ability or willingness to address the full range of
worker interests or expectations.).
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loyalty filters. To attain the golden rule solution it is necessary to
take further steps to reshape the corporate culture, steps which ac-
cept the differences in organizational goals between employers and
workers.168 Specifically, firms could foster this culture by coordinat-
ing labor policies at the shopfloor, collective bargaining, and strate-
gic decisionmaking levels within the corporate structure.1 69 The
next part explores these issues by analyzing how legal reform man-
dating codetermination may allow the parties to avoid the prisoners'
dilemma problem by altering the rules of the game so that coopera-
tion is easily recognized as a more attractive strategy than defection.
III
X-EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
This part analyzes how legal reform that grants employees a
role in corporate governance would support the gift exchange of
high effort expenditure by workers and working conditions by man-
agers. Part IV of this Article proposes a new model of corporate
governance with directors serving as neutral referees to mediate the
competing concerns of stockholders and employees. The neutral
referee model has many of the goals sought by the German system
of codetermination. This part uses the familiar codetermination
model to examine how labor representation in corporate govern-
ance enables corporate cultures to facilitate participatory work pro-
grams. After examining how codetermination enhances X-
efficiency, this part provides an efficiency justification for legal inter-
vention to require firms to provide labor representation on corpo-
rate boards.
A. X-Efficiency and Worker Representation on Corporate
Boards
Under the German system of codetermination, workers elect
representatives to serve on supervisory boards of directors that en-
gage in strategic corporate decisionmaking. t70 Codetermination,
however, does not directly enable labor to force major changes in
168 Id. at 244; REICH, supra note 1, at 268 (Adjustment to economic change requires
that burdens and benefits be fairly shared.).
169 See, e.g., Klare, Debate, supra note 5, at 77 ("Progress toward democratizing work
requires abandoning the notion of a choice between adversarial and cooperative models
and developing instead institutional structures that combine the virtues and mitigate the
disadvantages of each.").
170 For discussion of the German system and developments in the European Com-
munity, see, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of
Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459 (1984);
Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study
From an American Perspective, 28 AM.J. COMP. L. 367 (1980); Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the
"Modern" Corporation: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966).
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corporate policy. Rather, most of the employees' influence occurs
through separate employee organizations called Works Councils. 171
Codetermination enhances the effectiveness of these Works Coun-
cils by providing labor representatives with the opportunity to at-
tend board meetings and review firm documents. Employees can
gain access to reliable information concerning the firms' financial
situation and planned innovations concerning work rules and tech-
nological shifts. Although providing workers with representation
on corporate boards increases organizational costs, these additional
expenses are outweighed by the potential gain of eliminating X-inef-
ficiencies under the traditional system of corporate governance.
Under the traditional system, employee distrust arises because
managers have an informational advantage and nonlegal enforce-
ment mechanisms are inadequate to prevent the expropriation of
human capital investments.' 72 For these reasons, employees resist
technological advances and new shopfloor practices by insisting
upon contractual work rules that limit and delay such innova-
tions. 173 Conversely, codetermination facilitates the flow of credible
information to employees. Employees are less skeptical about man-
agement's assessment of the firm's economic condition because they
have access to the information needed to make their own evalua-
tion.174 By enhancing workers' ability to monitor the firms' per-
formance, codetermination restrains opportunistic conduct by firms.
Specifically, if managers renege upon implicit employment arrange-
ments, employees can hold them accountable in future interactions
by withdrawing cooperation and reducing effort norms. 175 In this
way, codetermination provides incentives for employees to invest in
firm-specific skills by protecting these investments from
expropriation. 176
171 See, e.g., Roy Adams, Workers'Participation in Management in West Germany: Impact on
the Worker, the Enterprise and the Trade Union, 8 INDUS. REL. LJ. 4 (1977); Clyde W. Sum-
mers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation, CoMP. LAB. L.J.
333 (1987).
172 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Jurgen Backhaus, Workers' Participation Stimulated by the Economic Failure of
Traditional Organization: An Analysis of Some Recent Institutional Developments, in
CODM-ERMINATrION, supra note 32, at 227, 232; Eirik G. Furubotn & Steven N. Wiggins,
Plant Closings, Worker Reallocation Costs and Efficiency Gains to Labor Representation on Board of
Directors, 140 J. INST. AND THEORETICAL ECON. 176 (1984).
175 See Roger McCain, A Theory of Codetermination, 40J. EcoN. 65, 83 (1980) (arguing
that strategic information offers the employees a "more valuable hostage" in future ne-
gotiations with managers).
176 See, e.g., Eger & Weise, supra note 32, at 64. Codetermination also enhances the
internal efficiency of firm operations because workers are in many respects better posi-
tioned to monitor a firm's management than shareholders. Henry Hansmann, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99
YALE LJ. 1749, 1768 (1990). Other commentators cast doubt upon the idea that work-
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By reducing the employees' risk of opportunism, codetermina-
tion provides a commitment structure that supports the process of
building high trust relations between managers and workers.177 Co-
operative behavior depends upon the willingness of one player to
make the initial move to cooperate, which risks exploitation by the
other player. 178 Under codetermination, firms make this type of co-
operative move by relinquishing an informational advantage. At the
same time, however, this move increases the firm's vulnerability to
opportunism by employees. Yet, this loss of control is exactly the
type of necessary risk-exposing action that plays an important role
in promoting the lock-in effect which establishes patterns of collabo-
rative conduct. 179 Viewed in this light, codetermination involves a
high-risk step that sends a strong signal of managerial trustworthi-
ness and dedication to a more cooperative regime in volatile eco-
nomic conditions.
By sending this signal to support the process of building trust,
codetermination establishes the basis for a corporate culture that
elicits high commitment performance. Under this culture, workers
may feel a moral obligation to reciprocate managers' trust by estab-
lishing higher effort levels, setting in motion a cycle of cooperative
efforts on the shopfloor.' 80 For example, employees may have
greater enthusiasm for new production methods because they have
some information to ensure that they will realize the benefits from
these innovations.' 8 ' In addition, communication throughout the
ers have the proper incentives to enhance the internal efficiency of the firm. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. ECON. 395,
403-06 (1983) (Workers lack incentives to exercise correct discretion in choosing among
investment projects.); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production
Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52J. Bus. 469,482-84
(1979) (Because horizon is limited to working life, investment decisions favor of quick
payoff.).
177 Marvin E. Rozen, X-Efficiency, Implicit Contracting, and the Theory of the Firm, in STUD-
IES IN ECONOMIC RATIONALITY: X-EFFICIENCY EXAMINED AND EXTOLLED 95, 115 n.15
(1990) (Klaus Weiermair & Mark Perlman eds., 1990) ("Substantive parity between the
parties, or at least the absence of great disparities, in the relevant dimensions of eco-
nomic strength is likely to be a prerequisite for trust to bloom. Dependency, because it
implies one-way flows, corrodes trust."). Alan Hyde and Robert Reich propose the use
of employee stock option plans (ESOPs) to remedy problems of low employee trust.
ROBERT REICH, TALES OF NEW AMERICA (1987); Hyde, supra note 80.
178 AXELROD, supra note 121, at 113-15.
179 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 55 (This enhanced communication allows "the per-
son who gives his trust [to be] in possession of enough reality to be able occasionally to
opt out of using them.").
180 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 116 (providing strategic information to
employees will contribute to gains on the shopfloor); Furubotn & Wiggins, supra note
174, at 64. See generally Lorenz, supra note 126, at 53 (stating that when trust is created,
obligated not to betray trust).
181 See, e.g., Eirik Furubotn, Codetermination, Productivity Gains and the Economics of the
Firm, 37 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 22, 27 (1985) (codetermination improves information
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firm may be enhanced as employees respond by relinquishing their
informational advantage concerning knowledge about more efficient
processes and work rules on the shopfloor. Furthermore, workers
may be more willing to accept lower working conditions in times of
financial difficulty because they will have more confidence that they
will gain from these sacrifices in the long-run. Accordingly, through
repeated play of the game, managers can obtain some assurance
that employees aspire to provide consummate cooperation for par-
ticipatory work programs.18 2
Supporting this view, economist Masahiko Aoki emphasizes that
firms acquire market flexibility by providing labor with representa-
tion on corporate boards. For example, German and Japanese cor-
porations appear to be more X-efficient than firms in the United
States. Aoki asserts that these productivity differences are partly ex-
plained by more employee participation in corporate governance.18 3
Of course, codetermination does not automatically produce
greater X-efficiency by offering an easy solution to the prisoners'
dilemma problem created in participatory work programs. It does,
however, facilitate the resolution of this dilemma by increasing the
flow of information within the firms and thereby providing greater
opportunities for effective communication between labor and man-
agement.8s4 Although repeated play of the productivity game may
also lead to labor-management cooperation under the traditional
system of corporate governance, codetermination is more favorable
to such an outcome because it removes informational barriers that
increase the potential for the prisoners' dilemma solution.
Given these possible increases in X-efficiency, it is necessary to
address the need for legal intervention to require labor representa-
flows between managers and workers); McCain, supra note 175, at 83-84 (Transition
from collective bargaining to codetermination reduces the number of employees's "free
variables" concerning work effort.); see also Roger McCain, Increasing 'Alienation:' The
Working Environment and the Direction of Technical Progress Under Alternative Forms of Enterprise
Organization, 3 ADVANCES IN THE ECON. ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR MANAGED
FIRMS 83, 101 (1988) (same) [hereinafter McCain, Alienation]; KoCHAN ET AL., supra note
1, at 111 (Prior consultation and participation increases employees commitment to
changes in production methods and willingness to reveal production inefficiencies.).
182 MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE
EcoNoMY 154 (1988); Roger McCain, Codetermination, Collective Bargaining, Commitment,
and Sequential Games, in CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at.115.
183 Aoki, supra note 38, at 124 ("T]he impression gained by observing the divergent
performances of firms having different national-institutional structures is that the rela-
tive magnitude of institutional inefficiency may be substantial."); Aoki, supra note 50, at
24 (Despite cultural and historical differences, there is a world-wide tendency to recog-
nize employees's voice in corporate governance.).
184 Eger & Weise, supra note 32, at 28; McCain, Alienation, supra note 181, at 104;
Warren J. Samuels, Institutional Reform: The Future of Codetermination: Comment, in
CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at 223, 225.
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tion on corporate boards. In addressing this issue, the next section
explores several ways in which the existing sociopolitical system im-
pedes the incentives for firms to adopt codetermination on a volun-
tary basis.
B. The Need for a Legal Solution to Solve the Prisoners'
Dilemma
1. Legal Intervention to Redistribute Power
a. Firms Have a "First Mover Advantage" Under the Existing
Rules of the Game
Corporate law should mandate codetermination because, in the
absence of crisis in situations, managers and shareholders tend to
resist employee participation in strategic decisionmaking. Under
the existing framework for collective bargaining, management has
no legal duty to negotiate with unions about economic restructur-
ing, technological innovation, and job security.185 Unions have diffi-
culty in bargaining for explicit contractual protections on these
issues because management often insists on "managerial preroga-
tive" clauses in order to maintain control over the firm's
operations. 186
Because codetermination involves sharing control with employ-
ees, this redistribution of power ensures that managers and share-
holders will oppose proposals for worker representation on the
185 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-86 (1981) (Section
8(d) does not apply to the decision to terminate business.); Otis Elevator Co., 269
N.L.R.B. 891, 893 94 (1984) (no duty to bargain over relocation); see also JIM ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERMCAN LABOR LAW (1983) (One of the dominant social
values in the interpretation and evolution of labor law is that workers do not have the
ability to make strategic decisions.).
186 See, e.g., Staughton Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 396,410 (1979) ("[L]abor relinquishes its most effective weapon against
management-its ability to strike . . . [while] management retains the prerogative to
disrupt the lives of its employees by relocating or closing its facilities."). Existing inter-
pretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) draw a line between the extent of
bargaining and the scope of unilateral decisionmaking referred to as the management
prerogative. Employers must bargain over whether to relocate a plant only if the man-
agers' determination is prompted by the need to reduce labor costs. Decisions based on
general economic conditions are not subject to mandatory bargaining. Although the
NLRA does not provide much relief, presumably, unions would attempt to negotiate for
explicit contractual protections against layoffs and plant closings. If managers were will-
ing to negotiate over these issues, employees could attempt to bargain for tin parachutes
that provide sufficient amounts of severance pay to compensate employees for their
firm-specific investments. However, several contracting obstacles would arise. The par-
ties would have difficulty in specifying the events that would trigger the tin parachute.
Additionally, enforcement problems exist because the labor law successorship rules do
not bind a purchaser of assets to a previous collective bargaining agreement. Professor
Stone explains in more detail the problems in drafting enforceable, effective tin
parachutes. Stone, supra note 82, at 63-64.
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corporate boards. Managers recognize that giving up managerial
prerogatives improves the bargaining position of labor, thereby in-
creasing the risk of opportunism. In game theory terms, the ex-
isting labor laws allow managers to have a "first mover" advantage
in the productivity game.'8 7 The prisoners' dilemma suggests that
first mover advantages increase the potential, for X-inefficiency be-
cause managers probably will act "rationally" and refuse to share
decisionmaking with employees, even though cooperation offers
larger returns.' 8 8
b. A Response to Free Market Arguments Against Legal
Intervention to Redistribute Power
Free market advocates argue that legal intervention is not
needed to redistribute control within the firm because in the long
run, competition ensures that internally efficient results domi-
nate.'8 9 Under competitive conditions, only the most cost-effective
governance structures will survive. Accordingly, free market propo-
nents suggest that labor representation on the board is less efficient,
because otherwise it would replace the traditional system in the free
market.' 90 Williamson emphasizes that parties have incentives to
adopt governance mechanisms that mitigate the threat of opportu-
nism.' 9 ' Thus, firms using participatory shopfloor practices have
the incentive to implement codetermination in order to reduce the
wages necessary to compensate workers for the risks of
opportunism.
Free market advocates assert that government has little power
over impersonal market pressures that cause corporate restructur-
ing. They warn that regulation of economic forces will ultimately
harm employees by decreasing investment incentives. Furthermore,
free market advocates argue that attempts to change the law will end
up hurting employees because employers will force them to pay for
these rights through lower wages. 192 These definitive accounts of
187 Ekkehart Schlicht, Codetermination, Collective Bargaining, Commitment, and Sequential
Games: Comment, in CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at 129.
188 Id.
189 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 39 n.22.
190 Id. at 33; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 787;Jensen & Meckling, supra note
11, at 473.
191 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 373; Daniel Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law
Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1984)
(Firms would voluntarily deal with unions in order to reduce their cost of labor just as
they voluntarily have their financial statements audited in order to reduce their cost of
capital.).
192 The law allows firms to externalize the cost of providing for displaced workers by
imposing this cost on the public sector. Corporate restructuring may result in long-term
benefits for the economy. These new opportunities, however, fail to assure that workers
faced with job displacement are compensated for their investments in the corporation.
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the inevitability of plant closure and the futility of regulation lead to
the conclusion that no alternative exists to the free market.
In this way, free market analysis serves to acclimatize labor to
the existing legal framework. Williamson provides a striking exam-
ple of the free marketers' propensity to reaffirm the status quo when
he argues that workers prefer participatory methods of shopfloor
organization and corporate governance systems over the traditional
methods. Because Williamson maintains that participatory pro-
grams are less efficient, he suggests that workers in these firms will
receive lower wages.1 95 Next, Williamson states that workers "re-
veal their preferences" when they chose Tayloristic practices and
high wages over employment offering higher job satisfaction but
lower wages. 194 Similarly, Williamson asserts that workers "reveal
their preferences" for traditional corporate governance systems
when they chose conventional employment over opportunities to
work for firms with alternative structures that offer participation in
governance, such as worker cooperatives.' 95
Studies show that workers prefer higher wages over better
working conditions. 196 Yet participatory work programs may sub-
stantially increase the X-efficiency of the firm, allowing workers to
obtain both higher wages and better working conditions. To
achieve this result, however, labor participation in corporate gov-
ernance structures needs to support these programs in order to fos-
ter an atmosphere conducive to a high level of employee trust.
Traditionally, employees have not participated in strategic cor-
porate decisionmaking.197 This historical pattern, however, is
changing. The major impetus for change is growing employer
Free market proponents argue that workers who are not hired at new plants lose as
much as workers gain at the plant that is not closed. Macey, supra note 103, at 179. This
article disagrees. People feel the loss of a "psychologically vested right of a given mar-
ket value more keenly than the loss of a prospect (a psychologically unvested right) of
identical market value." Ellickson, supra note 138, at 37 (discussing Tversky Kahneman
analysis). This argument draws upon the personhood theory of property rights and
posits that a worker develops an attachment to his job which is critical to his personal
identity. As Holmes stated: "[T]he true explanation of title by prescription seems to me
to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his sur-
roundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be displaced without
cutting at his life." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897); see also POSNER, supra note 136, at 79 ("Over time a person becomes attached to
property that he regards as his own, and the deprivation of the property would be
wrenching.").
193 Williamson, supra note 28, at 34-35.
194 Id.
195 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 472 (suggesting demands for democratiza-
tion of the workplace arise more from political activists than from the workforce).
196 PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 177 n.93 (1990) (discussing studies
concluding that workers rank pay higher than job satisfaction).
197 KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 181. Karl Klare explains:
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awareness that important decisions lie beyond the scope of collec-
tive bargaining.1 98 Increasingly, employees consider exchanging
wage increases for greater employment security and more influence
in decisionmaking.199 These developments have been concentrated
in crisis situations that threaten layoffs and plant closings.200 These
changes still represent fundamental departures from the traditional
system of labor relations. Industrial relations experts suggest that
employee interest in corporate governance will grow as global mar-
ket pressures continue to require strategic decisionmaking that ad-
versely impacts the employees' welfare. 20 1
Free market proponents' references to the immutable laws of
economics attempt to depoliticize social issues concerning displaced
workers and industrial democracy. Such legitimating theories ob-
scure the choices involved in enhancing employee participation in
corporate decisionmaking, which affects job security and working
conditions. In contrast, this Article contends that these choices
have significant implications for the efficiency of corporate behavior
in responding to international competition. In examining the need
for legal intervention, the next section explores how the sociopoliti-
cal system in the United States discourages firms from relinquishing
their first mover advantages concerning managerial prerogatives.
2. Participatory Work Programs and Socioeconomic Development
a. Free Rider Problems Impede Incentives to Change Conventions
Governing Industrial Relations
Cultural norms, conventions, and institutions increase the
transaction costs involved in introducing codetermination through
the contracting process. Given the long-standing convention of
shareholder supremacy and resistance to employee involvement in
strategic decisionmaking, firms are reluctant to deviate from the
traditional system of corporate governance because they fear
reputational sanctions for violating established business practices.
[1]f the legal system has historically been heavily biased in favor of hierar-
chy and against participation, the alleged employee preference of hierar-
chy may be "adaptive." If so, the efficiency attack on legal reform aimed
to increase participation is circular reasoning. Legal reforms of the sort
proposed here might enhance efficiency by removing the endogenous
conditioning of employee preferences.
Klare, Agenda, supra note 5, at 35.
198 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan et al., Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations Theoy, 23
INDUS. REL.J. 16 (1984).
199 See, e.g., DOERINGER, supra note 1, at 133; KocHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 112.
200 See, e.g., Kocsmt Er n., supra note 1, at 112 (Airline carriers near bankruptcy, not
able to offer employment guarantees, are much more likely to grant unions a broadened
role in management affairs.).
201 Id at 220.
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Given these reputational sanctions, free rider problems prevent
firms from undertaking the steps necessary to transform the existing
customs to favor more progressive labor policies.
In changing conventions, game theoretic reasoning suggests
that an individual firm will not necessarily move to the superior op-
tion of using codetermination, since it is not a superior option un-
less other firms also move and thereby alter widely accepted notions
of proper labor-management relations. 202 But other firms will not
move unless each firm can be persuaded that all the other firms will
also move simultaneously. In addition to these free rider problems,
each firm has an additional incentive to "hang back" because the
current restructuring era creates strong competitive pressures for
each firm to forgo the organizational costs in establishing
codetermination in order to maintain short-term stock prices. Thus,
firms are unwilling to adopt codetermination because it involves the
creation of industrial relations that transcend the narrow con-
tracting process. Consequently, public policy sets the climate for
labor-management relations by legitimating specific models of cor-
porate governance and affecting the costs associated with alternative
practices. 203
b. Cultural Support for Participatory Work Programs
The existing legal system not only promotes cultural condition-
ing that inhibits incentives to provide codetermination, it also per-
petuates the tendency for opportunistic behavior that leads to
adversarial labor relations. Under existing social and market norms,
firms that breach implicit employment arrangements face reputa-
tional sanctions in the labor market. These extralegal sanctions,
however, lose their effectiveness because the law condones the Dar-
winian process of "Creative Destruction." By failing to mitigate
these destructive impulses, the law represses the expression of altru-
ism, erodes the sense of community in the firm, and sanctions the
expropriation of workers' firm-specific investments. In times of eco-
nomic decline, the law promotes widespread instability in the labor
market that impedes efforts to nurture the gift-exchange necessary
for the success of participatory work programs.
Williamson acknowledges that the sociopolitical system nega-
tively influences the cooperative attitudes required for participatory
202 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74.
203 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan & Michael J. Piore, Will the New Industrial Relations
Last? Implications for the American Labor Movement, ANNALS, May 1984, at 473 ("These
changes at the micro level of industrial relations are likely to be successful only if
macroeconomic policies are reformed to provide a more supportive role for the labor
movement in society.").
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work programs. 20 4 Specifically, he doubts that participatory work
programs will be successful in the United States because these pro-
grams depend upon a system of relational contracting to prevent
opportunistic conduct.20 5 Williamson explains:
The 'special problems' of soft contracting . . . are particularly
great when soft contracting is introduced into an alien culture.
The reason for this is that the entire burden of providing contrac-
tual safeguards falls entirely on the immediate parties to the trans-
action if background cultural supports are missing. Should one of
the parties choose to defect, there is no further support for sus-
taining the transaction to which either can appeal. 206
Because participatory work programs depend on the background
culture to provide reputational sanctions, 207 Williamson suggests
that participatory programs may be more viable in countries like Ja-
pan rather than the U.S. For these reasons, Williamson asserts that
the United States may have to employ the traditional model of work
organization. 208
Williamson raises important issues by emphasizing how societal
and corporate cultures interact. However, he fails to recognize that
the law significantly affects industrial relations by influencing con-
ventions of economic behavior that develop within firms. 20 9 Legal
reform is necessary to provide employees with a role in corporate
governance to create the atmosphere of trust needed to overcome
the prisoners' dilemma problems inherent in participatory work
programs. Supporting this view, industrial relations experts suggest
that because German and Japanese corporations traditionally de-
pended upon foreign trade, the frequent need to adjust to external
204 WILLIAMSON, CAPITAmSM, supra note 8, at 39 n.22.
205 Oliver Williamson & W. G. Ouchi, The Markets and Hierarchies Programme of Re-
search: Origins, Implications, Prospects, in POWER, EFFICIENCY AND INSTTUTmNS 26-28 (Ar-
thur Francis et al. eds., 1983).
206 Id. at 28; see also LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 54 ("Western
culture does not emphasize altruistically cooperative behavior for its own sake .... It
appears more natural to try to be a big winner by performing according to a win/lose
strategy rather than by adhering to an extremely cooperative convention.").
207 Id. at 27.
208 WILLtAMSON, CAPrrALISM, supra note 8, at 28. Similarly, John Macey asserts:
[A] Japanese-style employment regime in which workers have job tenure
and employers have de facto assurances from workers that they will not
leave for other jobs in fact may be more efficient. But in this country
workers and their employees are not able to make employment contracts
containing these provisions because they would not be enforceable in
U.S. courts. Consequently, the dominant American regime of employ-
ment at will may be the market's second-best solution in the face of this
legal impediment to the contracting process.
Jonathan Macey, Firm-Specific Human Capital Investments and Hegelian Ethics: A Comment on
Cornell and Posner, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 507 (1990).
209 See, e.g., KocRAN ET AL., Supra note 1, at 230; LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra
note 72, at 53 (law supports conventions inside firm).
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and internal labor dislocations prompted early cooperation between
government, labor, and business to cope with the problems of dis-
placed workers.2 10 Recognizing these historical influences, Robert
Reich suggests that: "[a]daptation [to the new realities of interna-
tional competition] will require that American institutions, both
public and private, support the social changes that must accompany
economic change. And for this to occur, America must transcend
the peculiar distinction traditionally drawn between our civic culture
and our business culture. '211
IV
THE NEUTRAL REFEREE MODEL OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
In this part, I will propose a new model of corporate govern-
ance that would broaden directorial fiduciary duties to encompass
employees as members of the firm. First, I will explore how recent
developments in the areas of corporate law and labor law show
some signs of change in this direction. Next, I will discuss how cor-
porate fiduciary law could be revised to protect employees from op-
portunistic conduct and promote corporate cultures that foster
mutual trust between managers and employees.
A. Redefining Corporate Law and Labor Law: Reflecting the
Employees' Changing Role in the Corporate Structure
In the past, the dominant role of collective bargaining in labor
law and the prevailing paradigm of shareholder supremacy in corpo-
rate law have created intellectual barriers to consideration of viable
corporate schemes to promote labor-management cooperation.
These underlying assumptions, however, are being challenged as
both labor law and corporate law undergo a process of transforma-
tion that reflects the changing nature of the employees' role in the
corporate structure. At the shopfloor level, there is a growing inter-
est in amending the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 212 in re-
moving barriers that prevent firms from establishing employee
committees, and in discussing issues that traditionally have been re-
served for union representation. At the board level, directorial fidu-
ciary duties have been revised to allow greater discretion to consider
employee interests in making strategic decisions. Although these
210 REICH, supra note 1, at 10.
211 Id. at 6; see also Joseph Singer, Stakeholders, U. TORoNTo L.J. (forthcoming 1993)
(We "face a quasi-constitutional problem about the forms of social life we want to
adopt.").
212 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
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changes are significant, these developments are inadequate to meet
the needs of the modem workplace.
1. Participatory Work Programs: Challenging the Framework of the
NLRA
Given that less than seventeen percent of the workforce is un-
ionized, 213 the existing system of labor law that emphasizes collec-
tive bargaining simply does not describe the realities of
contemporary American labor relations. 2 14 For this reason, many
labor scholars maintain that a need exists for employees to have the
opportunity to participate in alternative mechanisms of workplace
governance that would complement the present system of union
representation. A foundation to establish such institutions can be
seen in efforts by many corporations to implement employee in-
volvement committees that oversee the policy decisions involved in
participatory work programs. 215 At this point, however, these ef-
forts appear to conflict with the NLRA in two respects. 216
First, some types of participatory work programs may violate
the prohibition against company involvement in labor organiza-
tions. 217 Under the NLRA, the framework for collective bargaining
213 See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers's Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1778-81 (1983) (describing decline of unionism
and growing anti-unionism in business community).
214 Clyde Summers, Labor Law As the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB.
L. REv. 7, 10 (1988) ("The consequence is foreseeable, if not inevitable; if collective
bargaining does not protect the [weaker party], the law .... either through the courts or
the legislatures, will become the guardian. Labor law is now in the midst of that chang-
ing of the guard.") [hereinafter Summers, Labor Law]; Clyde Summers, Past Premises, Pres-
ent Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 9, 17 (1982) [hereinafter
Summers, Past Premises].
215 Summers, Past Premises, supra note 214.
216 For an extended discussion of this issue, see Stephen Schlossberg & Steven M.
Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. LJ. 595
(1986).
217 Section 8(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer to "dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it .. " National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(1988). In Section 2(5), Congress provided a broad definition of the term "labor organi-
zation," to include "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee represen-
tation committee or plan" that deals with management concerning "grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988). An employee committee is not illegal if
it only exists for the purpose of providing a means of communication between the repre-
sentatives and the employees. Such a committee becomes a labor organization under
Section 2(5) when the employee members communicate in a representative capacity re-
garding mandatory bargaining subjects such as grievances and working conditions.
The legality of using employee involvement committees in a non-union setting is
currently being reviewed by the National Labor Relations Board in Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992). In this case, Electromation (the "Company"), set up Ac-
tion Committees to address serious morale problems arising from the Company's deci-
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is based upon adversarial procedures and relationships. In order
for unions to effectively advance their interests, the NLRA seeks to
secure the union's independence by prohibiting actions that could
result in managerial domination of the union. Section 8(a)(2) pro-
hibits employers from supporting or assisting organizations that
represent workers in discussions over wages, hours, and working
conditions. 218 Firms that establish committees to oversee par-
ticipatory work programs may violate this prohibition.
Second, uncertainty also exists for unionized workers involved
in participatory work programs because the NLRA limits the right to
form unions to employees that lack supervisory duties. 21 9 The
NLRA draws a clear line between "workers" and "supervisors" that
parallels Taylorism's basic separation of "thinkers" from "doers."
The new shopfloor practices, however, blur this distinction by al-
lowing workers to make supervisory decisions regarding discipline,
job assignments, and hiring. Because the NLRA excludes employ-
ees who perform a discretionary managerial function from union
representation, unionized workers fear that they may lose their right
sions to change its attendance policy and not give pay increases. The employer selected
Action Committee members from a list of employees who volunteered to participate by
investigating facts, generating ideas, and providing input to management in an advisory
capacity. Management requested that Committee members discuss the issues with their
co-workers; thus, the Action Committee members were expected to serve in a represen-
tative capacity.
The NLRB administrative law judge found that the Action Committees were labor
organizations and that Company had unlawfully dominated these Committees. The
Company appealed to the National Labor Relations Board. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board asked the parties to specifically address two issues:
(i) At what point does an employee committee lose its protection as
a communication device and become a labor organization?
(ii) What conduct of an employer constitutes domination or inter-
ference with the employee committee?
For an overview of this case, see, e.g., Madelyn Carol Squire, Reality or Myth: Participatoy
Programs and Workplace Democracy, STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). By raising these
issues, the Board appeared to be on the verge of formulating a new age of cooperation
in the workplace. Yet many commentators agree that given the facts of the case, the
Board had little choice in finding that the Action Committees constituted a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of section 2(5) and that Electromation's conduct constituted
domination in violation of section 8(a)(2).
218 In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959), the Supreme Court
held that an employee group "dealing with" issues under the NLRA constitutes a "labor
organization" under 8(a)(2). There has been a growing trend to retreat from the Cabot
Carbon decision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d
288 (6th Cir. 1982) (Committee of workers and managers discussing working conditions
did not constitute "labor organization."); General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232,
1234 (1977).
219 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (defining "employee"); 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988) (de-
fining "employer"); 29 U.S.C. § (11) (1988) (defining "supervisor"). See NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (University professors with great discretion
over administrative issues cannot unionize.).
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to collective bargaining protection if they participate in the firm's
employee involvement programs. 220
For these reasons, the NLRA should be revised to accommo-
date the growing use of employee involvement committees.221 La-
bor law scholars assert that Section 8(a)(2) should be repealed to
allow firms to develop programs that permit employees to voice
their concerns about the workplace environment and production
methods. In addition, the NLRA should be amended so that union-
ized employees can retain their right to participate in collective
bargaining.
Although the trend toward employee committees indicates
greater receptivity to employee involvement in workplace govern-
ance, these efforts do not provide the worker representation and
collaboration necessary for the success of participatory work pro-
grams. First, the continued operation of these programs typically
depends upon the unilateral discretion of management; thus, they
involve a low-risk step that may easily be reversed. Second, manag-
ers usually do not relinquish their informational advantage regard-
ing the firm's financial situation and planned innovations. In order
to promote the high level of worker trust required to attain greater
X-efficiency, legal reform is required to compel firms to provide ac-
cess to information that allows workers to supervise management
and analyze strategic policies. Paul Weiler proposes legislation
along these lines that would establish elected Employee Participa-
tion Committees modeled after German Works Councils. 222 He
suggests that German Works Councils have successfully responded
to many of the same issues concerning economic and industrial
change that affect the American workplace. 223 Under Weiler's pro-
posal, however, the Employee Participation Committees would not
220 See, e.g., Charles Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-first
Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 644; William Gould, Reflections on Workers' Participation,
Influence, and Power Sharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. GIN. L. REv. 381, 383-
84 (1989); Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499 (1988). So far, the Yeshiva case has not been widely
used to deny employees the right to unionize. See, e.g., Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B. 621
(1987) (team leaders still employees under NLRA).
221 See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 196, at 34.
222 Paul Weiler advocates the adoption of employee participation committees by
firms that employ more than twenty-five workers. Id. at 88 (recognizing necessity to
"satisfy the need for meaningful protection and participation in the workplace, rather
than simply to preserve the institutional formats through which those functions have
traditionally been performed"). Some labor scholars such as Karl Klare and Katherine
Stone assert that union presence is necessary to ensure that cooperative programs do
not coopt workers. Klare, Debate, supra note 5, at 68; Stone, supra note 18, at 169-71.
223 Stone, supra note 18, at 172.
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provide workers with a role in board decisionmaking and the ability
to challenge firm policies in a binding way as they do in Germany.224
In contrast, this Article maintains that judicial recourse is neces-
sary for Employee Participation Committees to protect workers
from opportunistic conduct. This reform would allow employees to
sue for breach of directorial fiduciary duties. Although recognizing
directorial fiduciary duties to employees would represent a substan-
tial shift in the law, recent developments in corporate law demon-
strate that some precedent exists to support this obligation.
2. The Legal Model of the Corporation: Movements Away From
Shareholder Supremacy
In the past, shareholder supremacy defined the boundaries
within which most of the debate about corporate governance oc-
curred. The takeover era, however, highlighted the fundamental
conflict between the interests of shareholders and the concerns of
other constituents who rely upon the corporation for their well-be-
ing. Courts and legislatures responded to the consequent social
costs by granting directors discretion to consider nonshareholder
constituents in making strategic decisions. 225 These developments
aid directors in preventing changes in control that offer sharehold-
ers large premiums, but threaten the nonshareholders' investments
in the firm.
This shift in corporate law is illustrated in Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time Inc.226 In this case, after Time and Warner agreed
to merge, Paramount announced a tender offer for Time. The Time
board favored the Warner merger, viewing the Paramount bid as a
threat to Time's corporate culture of editorial independence and
journalistic integrity. Time and Warner restructured their transac-
tion to block the Paramount proposal. The Delaware Supreme
Court stated that Time did not place itself on the auction block
merely by pursuing its long-term business strategy to merge with
Warner.227 Thus, the Paramount case came close to explicitly sanc-
224 Weiler does not give much priority to the "empty promise" of codetermination.
WEILER, supra note 196, at 220. He states, "lodging essentially unilateral control in
management is not a recipe for exploitation." Id. at 217.
225 See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REV. 865 (1990); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the
Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1990).
226 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-52 (Del. 1989).
227 571 A.2d at 1153. For further discussion of this case, see Lyman Johnson &
David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAw. 2105 (1990). Many cases decided dur-
ing the takeover era illustrate how the legal model of the firm is changing to consider
employee concerns. For example, in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559
A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989), the special employee relationship elements led the Court to
sustain the use of an employee stock option plan (ESOP) to prevent a takeover. In Sham-
950 [Vol. 78:899
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tioning the "just say no" defense. It established that directors have
no duty to maximize the shareholders' short-term value and that di-
rectors may take into account the interests of other constituents
when making decisions. 228
State legislatures enacted antitakeover statutes in response to
concerns that nonshareholder constituents need protection from
corporate restructuring. Specifically, over one-half of the states
adopted such statutes designed to broaden directors' discretion to
resist takeovers by considering the interests of employees, suppliers,
customers, and other nonshareholder constituents. 229 With one ex-
ception, the stakeholder statutes are permissive; that is, they do not
compel directors to address the needs of nonshareholder constitu-
rock, the court held that an ESOP funded through wage concessions was "shareholder
neutral." This led the court to lower the degree of scrutiny in reviewing the board ac-
tion surrounding the defensive tactic. Id. at 275 76.
In Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075CK, 1993 WL 132385 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), Washtenaw County Judge Donald Shelton ordered General Mo-
tors to keep its Willow Run plant open based upon promissory estoppel. Judge Shelton
found that General Motors made statements that it would keep the plant open if
"favorable market demand" justified it. In reliance upon these statements, the Town-
ship of Ypsilanti gave $1.3 billion in tax abatements to General Motors. Judge Shelton
stated:
Industry is a source of many of the jobs in our nation and it may well
be that our nation needs a new relationship of trust and cooperation be-
tween government and industry in order to compete with heavily subsi-
dized industries from other ... countries. But such an effort must be
national in scope and must be a real partnership with industry, not one in
which industry simply views government as ... another opportunity to
increase profits.... This tax subsidy policy results in pitting state against
state and municipality against municipality in an inter-governmental bid-
ding war. The local governments of this State are placed in a position
where they feel that they have no choice but to give taxpayers' resources
away under a statute which does not mandate that they receive anything
in return for those forgone taxes. Moreover, it has been recognized by
reputable economics scholars for over ten years that the tax subsidy pro-
gram, at least as adopted in Michigan, simply does not work and has little
if any effect on industry investment or location decisions.
Id. at 21-22.
In another case, the District Court of New Jersey allowed an innovative claim
against a raider by workers who lost their jobs as a result of the use of defensive leverag-
ing; the employees brought suit on the basis that the raider tortiously interfered with
their employment contract. Glass Molders, Putty, Plastics, and Allied Workers Int'l
Union v. Wickes Co., 707 F. Supp. 174, 179-80 (D. N.J. 1989). For a discussion of the
Glass Molders case, see Allan Kanner, Protecting Workers From Unlawful Interference With Their
Jobs, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 171 (1992). Outside the takeover context, the Delaware
Chancery Court recently indicated that directors may consider "the best interests" of
the corporation, rather than just the shareholders' interests once the corporation
reaches the "vicinity of insolvency." Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33 n.55.
228 571 A.2d at 1153.
229 For extensive treatment of these statutes see Symposium: Corporate Malaise-Stake-
holder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1991); see also Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Consistency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 701 (1992).
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ents. To date, the courts have not interpreted the scope of these
provisions. Although takeover activity has decreased, this legisla-
tion may have a profound impact upon corporate law because most
of the statutes are worded broadly to encompass any business
decision.
This review ofjudicial and legislative responses to the takeover
era demonstrates that corporate law is undergoing significant para-
digmatic changes. 230 Allowing directors to consider employee in-
terests in corporate restructuring significantly alters the legal model
of the corporation. In the past, corporate law did not concern itself
with the needs of various nonshareholder constituencies because
contract law, rather than fiduciary duty, determined management's
obligations to these groups. The courts and legislatures have not
explicitly stated the basis for expanding directorial responsibilities
to nonshareholder constituents. Employees, however, are the con-
stituent mentioned most often in discussions concerning directors'
duties to nonshareholders. Similar to recent inroads upon the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine,23 ' the shift in corporate law may reflect
social values that are more receptive to recognizing that employees
230 Jeffrey Gordon notes that "the Paramount decision portends a change in the
socio-legal culture of corporate law." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1991). He continues:
Certainly in the constitutional realm courts have become comfortable
with the idea that their decisions gain legitimacy from an emerging social
consensus and properly play a role in shaping that consensus as well as
heralding it.... Yet, unlike constitutional law, the shaping of corporate
law has seemed a more technical enterprise, removed from broad social
impulses.
Id at 1981 (footnote omitted). Gordon concludes that "Paramount can best be under-
stood as ajudgment that a self-regulating market such as an unbridled market in corpo-
rate control, threatens fundamental social values such as loyalty, continuity, and
community, and, that at the very least, takeover activity needed to be slowed down." Id
at 1933; see also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE LJ. 201, 252 (noting
that the Time decision acknowledges the public significance of corporate activity).
231 For the most part, the current exceptions to employment at-will do not provide a
remedy for opportunistic breach of an implicit contract. Yet, there is some movement in
this direction. Regardless of the employer's formal or express intention, it is sufficient
for some courts that a worker draw inferences of an implied contract of employment
from the employer's statements or behavior. For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980), the court stated that, in establishing
personnel policies and practices: "The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treated fairly." The court found that reliance upon state-
ments in an employees' manual gives workers a cause of action. Id. at 885.
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), the em-
ployer fired a salesman to avoid paying a large commission bonus under the employ-
ment contract, representing a clear attempt by the firm to appropriate the employee's
wages. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court supplied a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into Fowler's employment contract, and awarded him his bonus. Id at
952 [Vol. 78:899
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make significant investments in the firm that depend upon how di-
rectors manage the corporation's affairs.
Although these changes in corporate law reflect a greater con-
cern for nonshareholder constituents, they are inadequate because
employees do lack the right to challenge decisions made on their
behalf. For this reason, some corporate scholars assert that courts
should provide nonshareholder constituents with standing to sue
for breach of directorial fiduciary duties.23 2 In their proposals for
reform, these commentators also include nonshareholder constitu-
1255-56. So far, however, the courts in Massachusetts have not extended the holding in
Fortune beyond cases of wrongfully withheld commissions.
Explaining the impetus behind these changes in the employment-at-will doctrine,
Clyde Summers states:
Ihe courts and legislatures have built on an underlying assumption,
more nascent than fully developed, that the employee has a valuable in-
terest in his or her job which ought not be arbitrarily taken away. This
assumption is implicit in the breakdown of the employment at will doc-
trine, for it is the courts' sense of that valuable interest which spurs them
to develop legal theories which will provide protection.
Summers, Labor Law, supra note 214, at 15.
232 Recently, several commentators have proposed models that include standards
for assigning weights to the interests of various constituents. Some of these models do
not grant nonshareholders standing to sue. For example, Morey McDaniel asserts that
directors should act as bargaining agents for stakeholders as well as shareholders.
Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 SvnrsoN L. REv. 121 (1991). His
model replaces the single goal of shareholder wealth maximization with the dual goal of
"maximiz[ing] stockholder gain" while "minimiz[ing] stakeholder loss." Id. at 137. In
pursuing this dual goal, McDaniel recommends three guidelines. First, the board should
reject any proposal where stakeholders lose more than shareholders gain. Id. at 131-32.
Second, if shareholders gain more in a transaction than stakeholders lose, directors
should ensure that stakeholders are compensated. Id. at 132-33. Finally, under the
most controversial proposal, directors may allow stakeholders to share in the gain be-
yond any compensation for loss, because stakeholders also bear residual risk. Id. at 135-
36. However, any benefits awarded to stakeholders must bear a reasonable relationship
to the benefits received by shareholders. Under another model, Stephen Bainbridge
argues that Unocal provides an appropriate framework for applying the nonshareholder
constituency statutes to all structural decisions. Stephen Bainbridge, Interpreting Non-
shareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992).
Other commentators have formulated models that provide nonshareholder constit-
uents with standing to sue. David Millon recommends three standards to guide direc-
tors. Millon, supra note 5, at 265-68. First, directors should not seek short-term
shareholder gain if such action will harm legitimate nonshareholder investments. Id. at
266. Second, directors should "harmonize the shareholders' financial interest and non-
shareholder interests in stable relationships with the corporation." Id. at 267. Finally,
"management should honor the legitimate expectations of nonshareholder constituen-
cies if abrogation of existing relationships is necessary to serve the larger interests of the
corporate enterprise as a whole." Id. at 268.
Professor Lawrence Mitchell advocates that courts use the close corporation test to
balance conflicting interests. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tax. L. Rxv. 379 (1992). That is, after non-
shareholder constituents prove injury, the board should bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing a legitimate corporate purpose. Id. at 636. Then, nonshareholder constituents
should be allowed to prove that an alternative less harmful to their investments existed
for the board to pursue. Id.
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ents other than employees such as customers, bondholders, suppli-
ers, and the local community. In contrast, I focus on nonmanagerial
employees because they are the most vulnerable constituents and
they have the most direct relationship with the corporation. In addi-
tion, an adverse impact on employees tends to have a similar impact
on other nonshareholder constituents who rely on the corporation.
I have relied upon the stakeholder statutes, as well as general fiduci-
ary principles, to argue that directors should owe a fiduciary duty to
provide adequate severance pay, job retraining, and other benefits
to dislocated workers in plant closings and layoffs. 233 In the next
section, I expand upon this work by exploring how the neutral refe-
ree model may facilitate adjustments that are necessary for Ameri-
can firms to respond to global market pressures.
B. Proposal to Reform the Legal Model of the Corporation to
Recognize Employees' Stake in the Firm
1. Directorial Fiduciary Duties to Employees
a. Fostering Trust in the Workplace
Fiduciary law best transforms the gift-exchange aspects of im-
plicit employment agreements into the language of the law because
the heavy moral overtones of fiduciary obligation encompass the
spirit of mutual respect, solidarity, and confidence that arise in the
workplace. Fiduciary law would protect these noncontractual expec-
tations because this doctrine imposes a higher standard of conduct
than that customarily accepted by the marketplace under the con-
tractual duty of good faith.23 4 In this way, fiduciary law would en-
courage employee trust and reliance upon the new implicit
employment agreements under participatory work programs.
Fiduciary doctrine would facilitate participatory work programs
because this doctrine would reflect the notion that trust in the em-
ployment relationship is fragile. If firms fail to abide by the terms of
the gift exchange, cooperation may quickly unravel in the absence of
the stabilizing influence of fiduciary duty. Under the existing legal
regime, workers and managers may fail to develop a high degree of
mutual trust because the law, and the cultural practices it makes
possible, habituate the parties to certain ways of viewing their asso-
ciation. Whereas fiduciary duties have a tendency to foster stable
patterns of cooperation, the lower duty of good faith that governs
at-will employment may reinforce the counterpatterns of exploita-
233 Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing
a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. RE V. 1189 (1991).
234 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DuKE L.J. 879 (company obligations under contractual and fiduciary duties).
[Vol. 78:899954
THE HUMAN CAPITAL ERA
don and conflict. Legally acknowledging that employees are mem-
bers of the firm through corporate law may reshape this
conditioning of preferences; the new fiduciary duty would symbolize
that workers and shareholders are partners in the enterprise who
have common interests in increasing the internal efficiency of the
firm. Viewed in this light, fiduciary law provides a loyalty filter that
would serve a preference-shaping function by encouraging the par-
ties to build ties of affection and loyalty that are needed to overcome
the prisoners' dilemma problem inherent in the productivity
game. 28 5
More specifically, fiduciary law would facilitate participatory
work programs because the possibility of legal sanctions would pro-
vide some assurance to employees who are uncertain about whether
to trust managers. 23 6 Indeed, the very existence ofjudicial recourse
for breach of fiduciary duty may deter opportunistic behavior by
firms. 23 7 By reducing the risks of trust, fiduciary law would provide
support for cooperative corporate cultures by allowing employees
to rely upon systems trust.2 8 This systems trust would signal that in
the future, the parties' relationship will be based on mutually benefi-
cial understanding and flexibility rather than on strict adherence to
legal rights and contract terms.23 9 Accordingly, fiduciary doctrine
would preserve the atmosphere of good will in the workplace and
thus better enable managers and workers to adjust to external mar-
ket pressures. 240
In contrast, Williamson warns that the adversarial atmosphere
of a courtroom is detrimental to the quality of the employment rela-
235 For a general discussion of the role of the law as a preference-shaping institu-
tion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REv.
1129 (1986) (changing preferences reflect the moral function of the law).
236 Cf. BARBER, supra note 129, at 23 ("[Tlrust is weakened if those who have become
justifiably distrustful have no recourse to the law and its controls.").
237 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1228 (1990) ("The Ojudicial role] expresses a societal recognition
that fair treatment in business relationships is both an important and desirable value.
The shift from telling parties to look out for themselves to encouraging cooperative
efforts ought to inspire management to a higher level of behavior."); G. Richard Shell,
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause ofAction,
44 V~AND. L. REv. 221 (1991) (discussing role of law in promoting trust).
238 Bratton, supra note 131; ef. J.A.G. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in
Close Corporations, 1972 DuKE L.J. 921, 946 ("[The] imprecise concept of fiduciary re-
sponsibility, at least as applied to majority shareholders ... has clearly promoted fair
dealing within business enterprises.").
239 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (the willingness of the parties to cooperate is derived from their
desire to preserve commercial relationships and to avoid damage to their business
reputations).
240 See generally LAN MAcNEIL, THE NEw SocIAL CoNTRAcT (1983).
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tionship.2 4 1 Williamson raises an important point because "trust
cannot be reduced to trust in the law and in the sanctions which the
law makes possible. ' 242 Otherwise, managers would act out of fear
of legal sanctions and not from the emotional feelings of trust.2 43
Although to a certain extent the signals needed to start a trusting
relationship are weakened by fiduciary obligation, these signals
would retain sufficient force to promote the trust-building process
in the employment context.2 44 Even though fiduciary law would
provide protection from opportunistic conduct by firms, the need
for employee trust remains because fiduciary obligation would not
fully compensate all breaches of trust. Because of the substantial
discretion and power entrusted to the fiduciary, and the consequent
difficulty of detecting fiduciary breach, fiduciary duties must be
somewhat self-enforcing.2 45 Fiduciary law promotes this self-en-
forcement by using a language of moral obligations that would pro-
vide incentives for directors to act ethically and to assume greater
awareness of and respect for the needs of workers.
The signals for trust provided by fiduciary law will not be effec-
tive if managers attempt to use them in an instrumental manner just
to increase efficiency. Under the neutral referee model, the most
effective managers will be those that are committed in their minds
and hearts to recognizing that employee participation in workplace
governance is valuable because it achieves human values by enhanc-
ing worker dignity.2 46 In short, fiduciary obligations to employees
enable managers to increase the internal efficiency of the firm
through their own genuine feelings of trust and acceptance of
corporatism.
Fiduciary duty would foster cooperative labor relations because
the development of trust requires that the calculation regarding the
impact of legal rules upon the relationship remains latent. For this
reason, the atmosphere of trust is destroyed when managers and
workers engage in extensive collective bargaining negotiations that
produce 500 page documents because it puts workers and managers
on their guard by making them suspicious of the motives of the
other. In contrast, the Saturn project agreement between General
241 Williamson, supra note 19, at 256 ("Adjudicatory review of the decisions of cer-
tain institutions, while perhaps insuring a 'better' decision in some objective sense, can
only disrupt on-going relationships within the institution and thereby hamper the insti-
tution's ability to serve its designated societal function." (quotingJustice Rehnquist, Ad-
dress at the University of Miami School of Law (Feb. 2, 1978)).
242 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 35.
243 Id. at 34.
244 Id. at 35-36.
245 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 830 (1983) (observing the
fiduciary law encourages "altruistic and moral behavior").
246 See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Motors and the United Auto Workers consists of only 20 pages,
which clarify their mutual goals in establishing an employee partici-
pation committee to govern their relationship. 247 Fiduciary law
would provide protection to workers who rely upon these types of
documents without destroying the energizing atmosphere of trust
that emerges when embarking upon a new approach to labor rela-
tions. In these situations, fiduciary obligations to workers would
serve as a back-up system seldom used actively, but always used
passively. 248
Indeed, legal regulation appears to have had this type of posi-
tive influence in Germany where the employment relationship is
perceived not so much as one of confrontation between workers and
management, but one of encompassing workers as members in the
enterprise.249 In contrast to the adversarial approach of collective
bargaining that exists in the United States, German Works Council
relations adopt a different perspective that is expressed in Section 2
of the Works Constitution Act: "The employer and the works coun-
cil shall work together in a spirit of mutual trust ... for the good of
the employees and of the establishment." 250 This cooperative at-
mosphere is also reflected in Section 74, which directs that workers
and managers "shall discuss the matters at issue with an earnest de-
sire to reach agreement and make suggestions for settling their
differences." 25'
This analysis of the role that fiduciary duty would play in foster-
ing trust in the workplace provides the foundation for a broader
evaluation of the neutral referee model. Under the referee model,
the most successful directors will win the trust and acceptance of
both employees and shareholders in their role as mediators. Con-
ventions that facilitate this acceptance could arise, in part, through
the development of legal standards that provide guiding principles
for the board to use in striking a balance between the interests of
employees and shareholders. 252 Thus, the next section continues to
explore the use of fiduciary law to regulate the employment rela-
tionship by examining the legal standard that would govern the di-
rectors' obligation to protect employees from opportunistic conduct
by firms.
247 WEILER, supra note 196, at 36-37.
248 Macaulay, supra note 239 (parties in long-term business relationships chose to
litigate only when reputational sanctions fail, usually in situations involving high stakes
or the termination of the relationship).
249 Summers, supra note 170, at 370.
250 The Works Constitution Act of 1972 § 2.
251 Id. § 74.
252 Aoki, supra note 50, at 18-22.
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b. The Legal Standard Governing the Directors' Obligation to
Protect Employees From Opportunistic Conduct
Many American directors currently view their role as balancing
the interests of employees and shareholders, but not as neutral arbi-
ters.253 When the shareholders' and employees' interests directly
conflict in situations like plant closings and layoffs, studies indicate
that directors refrain from expressing their moral sentiments about
employees due to their belief that they have a legal obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth. 254 By absolving directors from their
responsibility to act as moral agents, the current legal regime pro-
motes an end-game problem that threatens collaboration in the em-
ployment relationship. The neutral referee model would remedy
this end-game problem by ensuring that firms do not defect during
the last round of the productivity game. A legal standard is needed
that both shields the shareholders from managerial self-interest and
prevents the expropriation of the employees' firm-specific
investments.
Other areas of the law can provide useful analogies in formulat-
ing this legal standard. Similar situations arise when courts review
directors' decisions to engage in transactions that may benefit the
majority stockholders at the expense of the minority stockholders
and when they examine trustees' decisions to allocate investment
proceeds among beneficiaries. In these situations, courts use a fair-
ness test that requires substantive review to ensure that the benefi-
ciaries's expectations are not defeated. 255 Courts consider the
whole relationship to determine whether the fiduciary has fulfilled
its duty to the competing beneficiaries. For example, in the trust
context, courts evaluate the trustee's decision to allocate trust funds
between beneficiaries according to the primary duty to conserve the
trust property. In a similar way, the neutral referee's decisions
should be governed by an overall duty to maximize X-efficiency by
minimizing the negative impact that strategic decisions have upon
employees.
Most commentators reject the neutral referee model by assum-
ing that directors cannot serve two masters and that courts will sim-
ply defer to the directors' business judgment. True, a standard
253 Nesteruk, supra note 151, at 93 (citingJAY LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS
OR POTNrATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989)); see also Larry
0. Soderquist & Robert P. Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsi-
bility: New Guidelinesfor Management, 1978 DUKE LJ. 819 (stating that stockholders also
see directors' role as encompassing interests of nonshareholder constituents).
254 Nesteruk, supra note 151, at 93.
255 D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 56-58 (1977) (general discussion of competing
beneficiaries); HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 120-23 (2d ed.
1992).
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requiring directors to balance the claims of employees and share-
holders is not as easy to visualize as the shareholder wealth max-
imization objective. Yet, directors of worker cooperatives,
employee-owned firms, and codetermined firms must also face the
real world problems of integrating the conflicting concerns of em-
ployees and shareholders. 256 A greater understanding of these al-
ternative systems of corporate governance will further develop the
neutral referee model.257
Other commentators claim that because implicit agreements
are not verifiable to third parties such as courts, this lack of ver-
ifiability prevents legal enforcement of these arrangements. 258 Un-
fortunately, the terms of implicit agreements are not well-defined.
If they were, employees could sue to enforce them as implied con-
tracts. 259 Yet, most fiduciary relationships involve implicit agree-
ments; the fact that the terms are not explicit does not prevent
courts from protecting the beneficiaries from opportunistic con-
duct.260 This is because courts uphold the norms and conventions
that develop during the history of the underlying relationship. 26 1
256 German directors are charged by law to carry out their responsibilities in the
"interests of the company." Aktiengesetz § 93 (1965).
257 Unfortunately, however, little data exists concerning how directors balance com-
peting interests in these firms.
258 KIEps, supra note 79, at 110; Carl Shapiro &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unem-
ployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. EcON. R-v. 433, 442 (1984).
259 Joseph Singer has proposed the use of "a reliance interest in property" to pro-
tect employees in plant closings. He asserts:
It matters very little whether the reliance interest in property is conceptu-
alized as a doctrine of property law, contracts, torts, trusts, labor law,
corporate law, or anything else. The divisions between these areas of the
law exist merely for convenience, and it seems that rigid categorization
hampers analysis. A more unified analysis of entitlements is useful, as the
law and economics writers have convincingly demonstrated.
Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 700 n.309 (1988); see
also Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
1373, 1389 (extending reliance doctrine to grant employees rights in the workplace).
260 Courts often use fiduciary duty to prevent inequitable conduct that seems per-
missible under the explicit terms of a contract or statute. Many close corporation cases
reveal that the fiduciary duty notion can be used to avoid the explicit terms of a contract.
Most notably, Judge Easterbrook has stated that all contracts contain an implied fiduci-
ary term that neither side will behave opportunistically. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815
F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). Judge Easterbrook im-
plied that a narrow fiduciary duty arises from the employment at-will arrangement. The
court found a duty to disclose based upon an implied fiduciary duty to refrain from
opportunistically buying back stock. See also Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (in-
voking use fiduciary duty to prevent partner from using power to terminate at-will part-
nership to expropriate gains); Topper v. Park Sherwood Pharmacy, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (protecting at-will employee/shareholder in dose corporation context
by invoking fiduciary duty).
261 Id.
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Thus, fiduciary law reflects the changing nature of the employees'
investments in the firm.2 62
The vague moral duties in fiduciary law would allow the specific
obligations to employees to be formulated on a case-by-case basis
and provide the courts with discretion to tailor relief to the particu-
lar situation. 263 Perhaps the most serious practical difficulty courts
would face is determining the amount of compensation necessary to
make employees whole for their firm-specific investments after plant
closings and layoffs. Although precise measurement may not be
possible, these problems are not insurmountable. Analogies may be
drawn to age discrimination litigation that has developed the con-
cept of "front pay." This remedy reflects the notion of implicit em-
ployment agreements because it compensates workers for losing the
future value of their investments in the firm and having to begin
their career again at the bottom of the job ladder with a new em-
ployer.264 Another option would be to enact statutory safeharbors
that establish minimum rights for workers. For example, a satisfac-
tory solution would include the right to substantial severance pay
scaled according to length of service. 265 Such safeharbors would
ease the implementation of the neutral referee model by providing
directors with guidelines, while concurrently permitting judicial ex-
pansion of the directors' duty not to engage in opportunistic
conduct.
Although the transition to the neutral referee model would in-
cur organizational and societal costs, the success of the German sys-
tem in integrating the employees' voice in corporate governance
suggests that substantial X-efficiency advantages would be obtained
in the long-run. The next section continues to explore these inter-
262 Bratton, supra note 131 (fiduciary duty is not "alien morality imposed on busi-
ness people by the state").
263 This proposal represents a marked departure from the conventional method of
regulating corporate behavior; the traditional method calls for complex and detailed
legislation. Corporate scholars favoring internal reform over external regulation argue
that if the corporations' institutional structure remains unchanged, the reasons prompt-
ing government regulation may lead to more regulation. RALPH NADER ET AL., TAmING
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); Alfred Conard, Reflections of the Public
Interest Director, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977).
264 Cf. WEILER, supra note 196, at 248 (recommending this remedy be used to com-
pensate victims of unfair labor practices under the NLRA). For an expanded discussion
of front pay, see, e.g., Brian S. Felton,Jury Computation of Front Pay Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 76 MINN. L. REV. 985 (1992) (arguing that courts should allow
juries to calculate front pay).
265 Massachusetts enacted a statute, the first of its kind in the nation, which provides
that any employee terminated within two years after a change in corporate control is
eligible for a lump sum payment equal to twice the employee's weekly compensation,
times the number of years of service. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 183(b) (1988). This
statute, however, only applies to takeover-related job loss.
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nal efficiency aspects by examining how the neutral referee model
attains the advantages of the German system.
2. The Neutral Referee Model: A Variation on Codetermination
The neutral referee model resembles the German system of
codetermination by granting participation rights in recognition of
the employees' investments of human capital. Yet, similar to the
German system, workers' firm-specific investments would not entitle
them to a direct portion of residual earnings of the firm. Although
workers would not have the right to attend board meetings, the neu-
tral referee model offers workers indirect worker participation at the
board level by altering the way that directors balance the interests of
shareholders and employees. The neutral referee model also paral-
lels the German system because this governance structure would in-
clude Employee Participation Committees that require managers to
provide information and consult with employees. 266
a. The Duty to Disclose Information to Employees
The neutral referee model requires directors to inform employ-
ees about issues traditionally categorized as managerial preroga-
tives. Fiduciary law is an appropriate mechanism to facilitate this
aspect of the neutral referee model because disclosure is a promi-
nent feature of fiduciary doctrine.267 Disclosure obligations would
reflect the need for managers and workers to develop openness and
honesty with one another, rather than attitudes of skepticism and
distrust that currently prevail in the workplace. 268
Because this new model of corporate governance seeks to make
workers and shareholders partners in the enterprise, it is appropri-
ate to turn to the Uniform Partnership Act to develop standards for
disclosure to employees. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, part-
ners must render "on demand" full information concerning part-
nership affairs. 269 Access to the partnership books is one aspect of
the partners' overriding duty to share information. In some situa-
266 Smooth mediation and representation of diverse interest among employees by a
single representative body for employees is crucial. Aoki, supra note 50, at 16-22. This
single representative body must accommodate the most heterogeneous workforce that
has ever existed in this country. WEILER, supra note 196, at 5-6.
267 In general, parties have no duty to disclose in arms length bargaining. This rule,
however, is changing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (imposing
duty to disclose on sale of residence).
268 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 6:63 (1991).
269 Section 20 states: "Partners shall render on demand true and full information of
all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any de-
ceased partner or partner under legal disability." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20. As to
the duty owed by agents and trustees, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173.
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tions, courts have held that this duty is breached by a failure to make
affirmative disclosure even in the absence of an explicit demand. In
general, no demand is required if the circumstnces indicate that
the party entitled to disclosure is relying on the other party to vol-
unteer it. The extent of this broader duty to disclose depends on
several factors, such as the parties' access to financial records,
whether the nondisclosing partner managed the business and thus
was familiar with the relevant information, and whether the party to
whom the duty of disclosure is owed had the requisite knowledge or
expertise to protect herself.270
By analogy, directors should be required to provide employees
with regular and detailed information about the firm's personnel
policies and the broader financial condition of the firm. 27 1 Workers
would also have the right to demand any additional information
necessary to evaluate issues pertaining to working conditions and
job security. In order to obtain the X-efficiency benefits from en-
hanced communication within the firm, the neutral referee model
would establish Employee Participation Committees that could eval-
uate this information and consult with managers about strategic pol-
icies of the firm.
b. Employee Participation Committees
Under the neutral referee model, Employee Participation Com-
mittees would consult regularly with management about decisions
concerning the general economic condition of the firm. These stra-
tegic decisions would focus primarily upon employment issues such
as compensation, hiring and training, technological innovations,
work assignments, and layoffs and work reassignments.
These types of representative bodies would permit managers to
take full advantage of the knowledge and skills of the workforce by
allowing discussion of problems as they unfold. In addition,
through continual communication and negotiation, representatives
of labor and management may come to trust and cooperate with
each other to a much greater degree. Indeed, Works Councils in
Germany have demonstrated the capacity to reduce substantially the
conflicts that arise during industrial transition. Because fiduciary
law would provide judicial recourse for employees, and firms will try
to avoid litigation, there is reason to believe that this consultation
will be effective. That is, directors are not likely to make any impor-
270 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 268, § 6:64.
271 Leslie K. Sheldin, Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Im-
pact on the American System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 441 (1980) (dis-
cussing how to create greater labor-management cooperation through disclosure).
962 [Vol. 78:899
THE HUMAN CAPITAL ERA
tant strategic decisions without first considering the possible reac-
tions of the Employee Participation Committee. 272
Employee Participation Committees, as well as traditional un-
ions, would also aid employee efforts to exercise their rights as ben-
eficiaries of the new fiduciary obligations. Many commentators are
concerned that providing employees with additional legal rights will
produce a flood of litigation.273 In contrast, Paul Weiler emphasizes
the limited uses and value of the labor law in the workplace. Weiler
explains that the employees' ability to detect and complain about
violations of their rights depends on their widely varying intellec-
tual, financial, and organizational resources. 274 Thus, Employee
Participation Committees are necessary to give employees a better
chance to take advantage of their legal rights by providing financial
support and counseling. In this way, these committees would im-
prove the likelihood that the broader goals of the neutral referee
model would be achieved.
3. The Advantages of the Neutral Referee Model Over German
Codetermination
The neutral referee model not only accomplishes the same
goals as the German system of codetermination, it also may offer
two advantages. First, codetermination involves a potential threat
that industrial conflict at the board level could seriously impede the
process of directorial decisionmaking. In contrast, the neutral
model may provide a more efficient institutional device to resolve
the competing claims of employees and shareholders. In analyzing
employee-owned firms, Henry Hansmann suggests that "fiduciary
mechanisms may generally be a more effective substitute for the
market than are political institutions: Firms managedfor their work-
ers, it appears, often perform better than firms managed by their
workers." 275 Game theory also suggests that the neutral referee
model may reduce the potential for adversarial behavior because the
board can make rational group decisions rather than allowing the
272 Aoki, supra note 50, at 18-22.
273 Alfred Conard asks:
Why, then should not employees... be permitted to maintain derivative
suit? There does not seem to be any very good reason for giving them
less rights than shareholders. The real reason for withholding the deriva-
tive suit from employees is probably a belief that derivative and class suits
are often abused, and that broadening the right to sue would broaden the
abuses.
ALFRED CONARD, CORPORATONS IN PERSPECTIVE 405 (1978).
274 WE LER, supra note 196, at 28-29 (noting that wrongful dismissals are usually
filed by professional employees rather than unskilled workers).
275 Hansmann, supra note 176, at 1816.
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outcome to depend on the self-interested decisions of the two com-
peting groups.2 76
The neutral referee model not only resolves competing claims
in a more efficient manner but also may be more politically accepta-
ble than reform proposals for codetermination. Codetermination
may not necessarily be transferable to this country where different
ideas of labor-management relations prevail.277 In the past, the
strong aversion of employers to worker participation in basic en-
trepreneurial decisions precluded much discussion about
codetermination. In contrast, the neutral referee proposal draws
upon existing managerial customs and conventions in the United
States. In addition, the neutral referee model builds upon recent
legal changes in directorial fiduciary responsibilities of the takeover
era. Also, given the anti-union sentiment that pervades in the busi-
ness community and the growing interest in employee involvement
committees, these proposals may be more favorably received than
attempts to reform collective bargaining.278
The neutral referee model would promote evolution in the po-
sitions and attitudes of managers and workers by allowing the pro-
cess of reform to build upon existing business practices and
276 Aoki, supra note 50, at 18-22. Hansmann suggests that the fiduciary duty that
governs these plans should be viewed as an alternative to the market and political meth-
ods of making social choices. Hansmann, supra note 176, at 1816. Bruce Chapman has
extended this analysis suggesting that the fiduciary mechanism operates as a solution to
prevent inefficient cycling in the context of directorial fulfilling duties to competing ben-
eficiaries. Chapman, supra note 130. He explains the "restricted voice" used by Gordon
and Hansmann as a method of securing a "structure induced" equilibrium against polit-
ical cycling, so "restricted exit" needs to be used to ensure that there is no contractual
cycling. Id.
Hansmann suggests that extreme forms of devices to reduce conflict can be found
in those firms in which the board consists of outsiders who are self-appointing and not
removable except for cause. In these situations, the board is charged with managing the
firm as fiduciaries on behalf of the workers rather than being elected by them. He cites
as examples the "worker cooperatives" in Britain and Weirton Steel Company. Henry
Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming
1993). Lawrence Mitchell has proposed a similar solution in reforming the directors'
fiduciary duties to encompass obligations to nonshareholder constituents. Lawrence
Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992). He sug-
gests creating an independent board that is a self-perpetuating body. Under this propo-
sal, various corporate constituents would be given the right to sue to remove directors
for cause. Id.
277 Ronald M. Sharp, Codetermination: A Postmortem, 40 LAB. LJ. 323, 333 (1989)
("[C]odetermination is not about to sweep industrial relations in this country."); KIM
MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 191 (1988) (arguing
that cooperation will not lead to codetermination because of socialist tradition and pow-
erful unions in European countries).
278 Because labor law reform is intensely controversial, Weiler suggests that political
realism requires workers to invest their limited political leverage where it will have the
highest payoff. WEILER, supra note 196, at 228. Yet, he "give[s] comparatively litde
political priority" to "empty promise" of codetermination. Id. at 297-98.
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theories. In the future, workers may gain political leverage as eco-
nomic pressures induce new openness to ideas that have not com-
manded support in the past.2 79 Thus, in time, the neutral referee
proposal may lead to additional measures that would advance work-
place democracy.2 80
CONCLUSION
Responding to the demands of an international marketplace,
firms have adopted new shopfloor practices that depend on worker's
communicating crucial knowledge. As Robert Reich explains: "our
economic future must be rooted in the only resource that will re-
main uniquely American: Americans themselves." 28 1 Yet, the
changing practices on the shopfloor present a prisoners' dilemma:
although these programs present an opportunity for workers and
firms to profit mutually, the atmosphere of mistrust that prevails in
the workplace increases the potential for mutual loss. The capacity
to overcome this prisoners' dilemma will depend partly upon the
availability of alternative organizational structures that promote co-
operative corporate cultures. Thus, the United States faces a cul-
tural challenge to create organizational devices that encourage
collaboration and prevent exploitation. This Article has presented
an alterative model of corporate governance that revises directorial
fiduciary duties to promote a high level of employee trust and
commitment.
To expand worker influence inside the firm in a manner that
enhances X-efficiency, this Article maintains that the reconstruction
of corporate law must accompany the reconstruction of labor law.
This period of transformation in the workplace suggests that labor
law and corporate law scholars should seek common understanding
through dialogue concerning viable corporate governance mecha-
nisms to meet the needs of American workers in a global world
economy. Corporate scholars need to rethink traditional solutions
to corporate governance to accommodate the employees' changing
role in the corporate structure. Similarly, labor scholars should be-
gin looking at issues concerning institutional shareholders because
the employees' role in the codetermined firm is only half of the
story.
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